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1. INTRODUCTION 
Globalisation, caused by increasing trade and investment, is debated as either a saviour or a 
villain for developing countries. Within this context, two factors have the potential to 
condition a country‘s encounter with globalisation – their natural wealth and their policy 
towards human capital. Globalisation will increase the demands for extractable resources, and 
many places that have an abundance of these resources will either benefit or fail depending 
on how they deploy this wealth in their societies. How countries manage their natural wealth 
and invest in human capital will be vital to whether countries either reap the benefits – or 
suffer the consequences – of globalisation. A number of empirical examinations of long-term 
growth rates have shown that countries, rich in natural resources, are among the poorest 
economic performers (Sachs & Warner, 1995, 1997, 2001; Auty, 2001; Gylfason, 
Herbertsson, & Zoega, 1999; Ross, 1999). This poor trend in growth is commonly referred to 
as ―the natural resource curse‖. This apparent paradox goes against classical economic 
wisdom, which views natural resources as an important factor of production providing 
countries – rich in those resources – a key advantage that should translate into economic 
expansion and wealth creation. Indeed, recent studies have challenged the idea of a resource 
curse altogether, arguing that natural resources are in fact good for economic growth and 
questioning past findings of a negative correlation (Brunnschweiler, 2008; Brunnscheiler & 
Bulte, 2008; Alexeev & Conrad, 2009). As a result, the topic has re-emerged as a controversy 
in the political science and economics literature. This study departs from the focus on growth, 
which is often volatile and have differing social impacts in terms of welfare, to look at 
education spending, which is a longer-term investment in developing human capital. 
Aside from the debate over growth rates, natural resources have also been argued to have 
other direct consequences for development through the negative impacts of mechanisms like 
civil war, corruption, undemocratic regimes, poor governance and education. In view of this, 
and in response to a seeming preoccupation with economic growth in the literature, this study 
concerns itself with the direct development impact of natural resources through its 
relationship to one of the most important factors in today‘s global economy – human capital. 
More specifically, it investigates how natural resource dependence may influence a country‘s 
development prospects by affecting government decisions to invest in educational provision.  
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1.1 Rational for study 
The education level of a country‘s population is regarded as one of the most important 
determinants of its development. Since the 1980s, researchers in macroeconomics have taken 
on a more long-term outlook on growth, recognising that it is long-term growth rates that 
decide a country‘s prosperity (Barro, 1996; Romer, 1986). Simultaneous to this change, 
growth theory evolved with the emergence of endogenous growth models and their focus on 
technological advancement through increased human capital stocks, research, and 
improvement of methods and systems of production (see Romer, 1990; Lucas, 1988). The 
globalisation of production and capital, and the ever decreasing costs and time-scales of 
transportation, has meant that investment is increasingly dictated by less moveable 
production factors. In this context, an educated population and capable workforce has become 
the most important comparative advantage in the new global knowledge based economy 
(Ashton & Green, 1996). As a result, investment in human capital – especially education – is 
extremely important in facilitating a country‘s long-term economic growth. Consequently, 
government actions and policy decisions are expected to take a forward thinking approach by 
investing in educational improvement as a means to improving future development and 
prosperity. Education, while always important, has today taken on added significance for 
economic development. One could even argue that a country‘s human capital stocks – and 
not past or current growth rates – are perhaps the best indicator we have of a country‘s future 
development and prosperity. 
As part of a body of literature on the resource curse a number of scholars have argued that 
human capital suffers as a result several mechanisms triggered by natural resource wealth. To 
support this there is some empirical evidence that resource rich countries appear to perform 
worse in promoting human capital accumulation through education (Gylfason, 2001; 
(Birdsall, Pinckney, & Sabot, 2001; Kronenberg, 2004).  These studies have emerged in the 
context of a wider body of research that has sort to explore the variety of negative impacts 
that natural resources may have for a country‘s development, and has without doubt benefited 
from the input of political scientists to the existing economic literature. In this regard, 
explanations for the curse focus on economic and political negative externalities caused by 
natural resource abundance. These externalities have been referred to as the transmission 
channels by which abundance in natural resources is considered to retard development (see 
Gylfason, 2004; Papyrakis & Gerlagh, 2004). These include: rent seeking and corruption 
(Damania & Bulte, 2003; Shaxon, 2007), civil war and conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998, 
3 
 
2005; Ross, 2004); poor quality institutions (Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 2006), poor quality 
governance (Iimi, 2007), a lack of democracy (Ross, 2001a), social inequality (Gylfason & 
Zoega, 2002), poor investment rates (Papyrakis & Gerlagh, 2004), oligopolistic capitalism 
and non-developmental policy making (Auty, 1997), high poverty and low levels of human 
development (Ross, 2001b), and poor levels of human capital through education (Gylfason, 
2001a). Gylfason explains this by suggesting that governments in resource rich countries tend 
to deprioritised education. He also finds that poor education as one of the most important 
channels by which the resource curse on growth is transmitted, possibly even accounting for 
close to half of the negative impact of natural resource externalities on growth (Gylfason, 
2001a, p. 856). Poor education then, has thusfar been viewed as one of a number of 
explanations for the ultimate concern of most scholars in the resource curse literature, that 
being the poor growth rates of the economies of resource rich countries
1
. Education then, has 
tended to be reduced to the status of explanatory variable and indirect tranmission 
mechanism.  
Given the obvious vast importance of education for development, it would seem imperative 
to explore the relationship between natural resources and education in more detail. The 
theoretical mechanisms by which natural resource abundance can negatively impact on 
education are several and will be discussed in more detail in section 3. Such mechanisms are, 
however, mediated by government policy and investment decisions, indicating that any 
adverse effect of natural resources is not inevitable. This is supported by the experiences of 
Norway and Botswana, which have successfully translated their natural resource wealth into 
economic growth, good levels of education and improved living standards. Key to their 
success has been good policy measures and strong institutions that facilitate good governance 
(Gylfason, 2004). More commonly, however, the literature points to a tendency for 
corruption and sloth in government policymaking to prevail among countries rich in natural 
resources.  
There are a number of reasons for concentrating on education, the principal being that while 
some studies have found a trend of poor long-term growth rates among resource dependent 
countries, there also appears to be some evidence that resource dependent countries tend to be 
worse at converting any increase per capita GDP into the development outcomes that are 
surely the end objective of economic development – rather than growth in itself. One 
                                                     
1
 With the exception of those coming to the topic from peace and conflict studies who place civil war and 
conflict as their ultimate dependent variable.  
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explanation for this is that economic growth in resource dependent countries tends not to be 
based in endogenous factors like human capital accumulation and technological innovation. 
In other words, such countries have managed to achieve growth without having to first invest 
in the domestic foundations of growth that would be the case in countries lacking natural 
resources. According to this idea, growth based on exogenous factors – such as high 
commodity prices – will always be unsustainable, unless the growth is used to fund 
investment in human capital which promotes endogenous growth (Ranis, Stewart, & 
Ramirez, 2000).  
In this context it is important to ask the questions: does the available data actually 
demonstrate a deprioritisation of education in natural resource dependent countries? What are 
the potential explanations? and, can the curse be combated with other factors? 
1.2 Approach and Research Question 
This paper builds on existing empirical studies by Gylfason (2001a), Birdsall et al. (2001), 
and Kronenberg (2004) that have made examinations of the relationship of natural resources 
to education. This study, however, treats education as both a factor fundamental to 
development and as a development outcome in itself, and not just as a factor that influences 
growth. The first objective of the study then will be to explore whether natural resources are 
in fact correlated with a reduced commitment to education by governments. The second 
objective will be to assess the potential for improvements in governance and institutional 
quality, and economic liberalisation to mediate between the natural resource curse and 
education spending. Important theoretical and methodological issues related to the resource 
curse debate are also addressed. It is hoped therefore, that the present study will contribute to 
the wider debate on the role of natural resources for development and demonstrate the 
benefits of moving away from a fixation on growth studies towards trying to better gauge the 
more fundamental development impact of natural resources and resource dependence.  
The advantages of studying the resource curse from this perspective are several: 1) a good 
deal of research has already been carried out to establish the link between natural resource 
abundance and low growth rates, and the hypothesis has been well established. A body of 
literature has recently emerged questioning the claims of a negative relationship between 
natural resources and economic growth, and has forwarded valid arguments against some of 
the evidence published regarding the negative correlation between the two (see 
Brunnschweiler, 2008; Alexeev & Conrad, 2009; Brunnscheiler & Bulte, 2008; Ding & Field, 
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2005). The lack of consensus on the topic is not helped by problems particular to growth 
studies that may reduce their explanatory potential. Subsequent studies will do better by 
seeking to probe the substantive direct impact of natural resources on development; 2) 
Economic growth is not always a good indicator of wellbeing or human development (Sen, 
1998). This problem may or may not be more pronounced in resource dependent countries. 
According to theoretical advances in the concept of sustainability, natural resources are 
increasingly conceptualised as natural capital that is finite. Under this conceptual framework 
all types of capital should be utilised responsibly and used to invest in human capital through 
educational provision. So even if natural resources were shown to bring about growth, this is 
insufficient to conclude that natural resources are positive for development, since depletion of 
natural capital is not contemplated in growth statistics; 3) Educational performance also 
represents a future growth and development indicator as it increases human capital stocks. 
Under endogenous growth theory; long-term growth relies heavily on human capital 
accumulation. According to such arguments, commitment to education is one of the best 
indicators of the ability and willingness of a government to enact good policy measures.  
1.3 Outline 
In the following chapters, it is argued theoretically that there exist a number of factors that 
may reduce investment in education in resource dependent countries. Empirical evidence is 
then presented that oil dependent countries tend to spend less on education and appear to be 
victims of the curse, while there appears to be less evidence of a negative relationship 
between investment in education and dependence on non-fuel minerals. Further results – 
focussed on how political and policy changes may mitigate or exacerbate the negative 
correlation between oil and education – show that governance and institutional quality are 
important mitigating factors. In fact, well governed countries appear to use their oil for the 
benefit of education. Other findings suggest that economic openness in oil dependent 
countries is negative for education spending suggesting that economic liberalisation policies 
may not represent a quick fix for the resource curse (at least for education).  
The thesis is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the empirical basis for a natural 
resource curse, the historical evolution of the hypothesis and the basis for its present 
application to education. Section 3 describes why natural resource dependence could cause 
lower investment in education by focussing on how political decisions regarding investment 
may be affected by natural resources through a number of transmission mechanisms. Section 
4 explains the research design for the current study including a methodological discussion on 
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how best to measure resources in regression models – an issue at the forefront of the resource 
curse debate. Section 5 presents the ensuing results and further discussion of the principal 
findings. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  EMPIRICS AND BACKGROUND TO THE RESOURCE CURSE  
The following chapter provides an overview of some of the principal empirical findings that 
contributed to the establishment of the resource curse hypothesis. It then goes on to chart the 
evolution of thinking regarding natural resources and development, describing how the curse 
is being increasingly understood within the wider framework of sustainability and in relation 
to human capital and education. The chapter concludes by summarising the findings of a 
series of empirical studies that contradict the resource curse hypothesis, while suggesting 
potential implications for the present study.  
2.1 The Empirical Basis for a Natural Resource Curse  
Sachs and Warner (1995) found natural resource abundance – measured as a high ratio of 
natural resource exports to GDP in the base year 1971 – to be negative for growth over the 
period 1971 – 1989. This finding was robust even when controlling for other variables 
important for growth. Results in Leite and Weidermann (2002) supported this finding, as did 
Gylfason et al. (1999) who looked at a sample of 125 countries. Auty (1997) using a sample 
of 85 countries found that natural resource poor countries showed growth rates that were 
more than double those of resource rich countries over the period 1960 – 1990 even allowing 
for the effect of country size. Gelb et al. (1988), in one of the most thorough studies of the 
resource boom of the 1970s, found that growth rates of the period 1971 – 1983 (this included 
the downturn as well as the boom) were not only below those predicted by neoclassical 
growth models, they were in fact below the average of developing countries during the 1960s, 
the period before the resource boom. Gelb argued that countries that had appeared to benefit 
from the resource boom did not show average growth rates that were higher than would have 
been predicted in the absence of the boom.  
Figure 1 is taken from Sachs & Warner (2001). It shows a scatterplot of natural resource 
export intensity along the x-axis and real per-capita growth between 1970 and 1989 along the 
y-axis. The chart shows a trend of declining per-capita growth rates as the share of natural 
resources in exports increases, while there are a number of exceptions – notably Iceland, 
Malaysia and Mauritius. The chart does show however, that the fastest growing countries 
7 
 
over the period were all resource poor, while none of the highly resource dependent exporters 
managed to achieve high rates of growth. This trend then is the basis for the hypothesis for a 
resource curse on growth. 
Figure 1. Growth and natural resource abundance 1970-1989 
 
Exports of Natural Resources in % of GDP, 1970 
Source: Sachs & Warner (2001) 
 
2.2 Roots and Evolution of the Resource Curse Hypothesis 
While the term ―natural resource curse‖ emerged relatively recently, scholars were studying 
the phenomenon much earlier. In fact, Adam Smith demonstrated an early scepticism to 
mining when he wrote:  
Projects of mining, instead of replacing capital employed in them, 
together with ordinary profits of stock, commonly absorb both capital 
and stock. They are the projects, therefore, to which of all others a 
prudent law-giver, who desired to increase the capital of his nation, 
would least choose to give any extraordinary encouragement. 
(Smith, 2001 [1776]) 
Although Smith was primarily discussing here the case of precious metals, his attitudes to 
mining in general were that it was a much less useful activity than was agriculture. He noted 
R
ea
l 
G
D
P
 G
r
o
w
th
 p
er
-C
a
p
it
a
l,
 1
9
7
0
-1
9
8
9
 
8 
 
that the profitability of mining was dependent on scarcity. So the production of such 
commodities was doomed to be less and less profitable because its price would be dictated by 
the richest, most efficient and profitable mines (Smith, 2001 [1776]). He argued that the 
value of agricultural products was absolute as opposed to the relative value of mined 
commodities. This was presumably because, in Smith‘s time, food was less likely to be 
transported great distances and still be profitable.   
More modern examinations of natural resources studied them from the point of view of the 
overall development of nation states. Dependence on natural resources was used to explain 
the poor economic performance of Latin American economies during the 20
th
 century. The 
mineral producing economies of the region had suffered the impact of a collapse in world 
commodity prices during the interwar period. After WWII, economists from the region 
(notably Raul Prebisch) argued for the existence of a systematic problem for Latin America‘s 
resource dependent economies. By historically tracing world commodity prices Prebisch 
(1950) found that prices of primary commodities fell faster than those of manufactured 
goods. He argued that since poor countries from the ―periphery‖ tended to be net natural 
resource exporters, and net importers of manufactured goods from the rich ―core‖ countries, 
that uneven development was built-in to the world economic system. Rooted in dependency 
theory – although not himself a Marxist – Prebisch‘s ideas as well as important contributions  
from other economists working at the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), 
gave rise to the import substitution model that dominated Latin American economic policy 
for the following three decades.  
Prebisch made an important contribution to the understanding of the development trajectories 
of natural resource dependent economies, as well as to wider theories of development. 
However, empirical studies of the post-war period have shown that his declining terms of 
trade explanation does not fully account for the poor performance of resource dependent 
economies (Sachs & Warner, 2001, p. 831). In fact Prebisch‘s findings were subsequently 
brought into question by evidence that the greatest drop in primary commodity prices 
occurred with those commodities that were mainly exported by developed countries; while 
those primarily exported by developing countries remained largely stable (Rosser, 2006, p. 
14).  
The ISI development model that was supposed to overturn the problems associated with 
primary commodity led development, was also found wanting in the long-run, culminating in 
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the debt crisis of the 1980s. The crisis led to the near collapse of the economies of the Latin 
American region and ironically left most of them even more dependent on their natural 
resources. The apparent bafflement of economists regarding the poor growth performance of 
resource dependent economies, perhaps had a hand in the coining of the term ―resource 
curse‖ as a less than scientific explanation for the resources paradox.  
Other attempts by economists to explain these poor growth rates included: the inherent 
instability of commodity markets (Nurske, 1958; Levin, 1960; and Van der Ploeg & 
Ploehekke, 2009), where painful periods of recovery from periodic commodity price crashes 
were seen to negate the benefits derived from the proceeding period of growth; the tendency 
for natural resource production to occur in enclaves preventing linkages with the wider 
economy (Hirschman, 1958); and Dutch Disease
2
 (Corden & Neary, 1982; Bruno & Sachs, 
1982). 
While these economistic explanations are still considered to hold some explanatory power, a 
growing body of research has emerged questioning their ability to fully account for the trend 
of poor growth among resource dependent economies. For instance, research has also shown 
that the impact of commodity price fluctuations is perhaps more ambiguous than previously 
thought (Behrman, 1987), and that Dutch Disease can be combatted by sound economic 
policy (Usui, 1997; Larsen, 2004). Furthermore, such explanations have been shown wanting 
in cross-country empirical studies into the poor economic performance of resource dependent 
countries (Mikesell, 1997). Gelb et al. (1988), in a report on the natural resource boom and 
bust of the 1970s and 1980s, although sighting price fluctuations and elements of Dutch 
disease as contributing factors, concluded that bad government policy appeared to be the 
principal culprit. This was often because of over optimism and sometimes political pressure 
to satisfy interest groups (Gelb et al., 1988, pp. 139-141). 
In this vein, more and more economists and non-economists have since begun to look to 
political economy theories to elucidate further regarding the trend in poor economic 
performance of natural resource dependent economies. Any resource curse then is 
increasingly regarded as being caused through the mechanism of policy failure and 
unproductive or destructive behaviour, and less as the result of the inherent properties of 
                                                     
2
 Dutch disease is the rise in the real exchange rate of countries with resources relative to trading partners. This 
means that resource exports affect the competitiveness of other tradable sectors, which can affect growth and 
long-term development prospects. 
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natural resources that cause unavoidable exogenous economic distortions (see Gelb et al., 
1988; Auty, 2000, 2001b; Torvik, 2002 as good examples of this trend in thinking).  
The profits available from the exploitation of natural resources are undeniable, as is their 
potential for creating rapid growth – at least in the short term – as well as providing 
governments with much needed revenue from rents captured through taxation. It is also clear 
that many of the economic distortionary pressures can be combated through prudent policy. 
Despite this, the negative correlation between natural resource dependence and successful 
economic development appears to persist. Explanations for the poor performance of resource 
dependent economies have, therefore, shifted to reflect a more nuanced view of the internal 
political and societal dynamics and their interaction with resources. Such efforts have also 
sort to explain diverging experiences of natural resource driven economies by studying 
differences in patterns of resource rent allocation and investment.  
2.3 Natural Resources and Sustainability: the Role of Human Capital  
Good levels of saving and investment are seen as essential to bring about sustained economic 
growth. As such, the generally poor growth performance of natural resource dependent 
economies can be partially explained by the low savings and investment levels that are 
common to resource dependent economies. Papyrakis & Gerlagh (2004) suggest that poor 
investment rates may be the most marked link between natural resources and poor growth 
rates. In explaining the mechanisms that translate resource abundance to low investment and 
saving rates, Gylfason & Zoega (2006) argue that natural resource exploitation 
simultaneously reduces the need for capital investment, as this is replaced by the profits that 
go to resource owners. As a result, interest rates drop causing a reduction in saving and 
investment.  
Other explanations focus on the ability of governments to manage and utilise resource rents 
efficiently. Genuine, or net, savings is a measure of sustainable development under a softer 
interpretation of sustainability. Under this approach, revenues obtained from natural resource 
extraction are not included as part of a country‘s capital income without correspondingly 
reducing the country‘s overall natural capital stocks. This contemplates a country‘s total 
capital stocks, which also includes human capital as well as produced capital and natural 
capital. According to this system, a country can convert one kind of capital into another and 
be considered to be developing sustainably, so long as the total capital stocks of the country 
are not reduced. Given that natural capital is difficult to create, the obvious route to 
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sustainability would be to use both natural and produced capital to invest in human capital. 
The clearest way of doing this would be to invest in education.  
One of the features of resource driven economies seems to be that natural capital is converted 
into produced capital, which is then used to fund consumption rather than invested (Mikesell, 
1997), thus diminishing a country‘s total capital stocks. This could occur in the private sphere 
where resource rents are concentrated in the hands of a wealthy few and go to fund lavish 
lifestyles. On the other hand, in the public sector, governments may use resource rents to pay 
public wages of a bloated bureaucracy, or fund a large military rather than investing in 
education, or infrastructure.   Atkinson & Hamilton (2003) point out that poor growth 
performance in resource rich countries is linked to government resource rents being spent 
unsustainably in this way, with low rates of genuine saving. They provide some evidence that 
governments that invest rents towards future – non resource related – development, such as 
investment into human capital accumulation, tend to be better at avoiding the resource curse.  
In an empirical study of long-term growth trends, Ranis et al. (2000) found that investment in 
human development – measured as health and education – is always a necessary precondition 
to sustained economic growth. They found that countries that experienced periods of growth 
that were not accompanied by investment in human development could not sustain growth. 
Countries that invested in human development outcomes, either prior to, simultaneous to, or 
immediately after the onset of growth were much better at sustaining their growth. Their 
explanation was that growth and investment in human development creates a virtuous self-
perpetuating cycle. Failing to invest in human development inevitably leads to a vicious cycle 
manifested as periodic economic stagnation accompanied by poor levels of human 
development (Ranis et al., 2000, pp. 208-213). This seems particularly applicable to resource 
rich countries where volatile commodity markets can cause boom and bust cycles.  
Those governments that, instead of making the kind of investment described above, have 
utilised resource rents to sustain general government consumption (e.g. public wages) appear 
to have experienced the curse far worse (Atkinson & Hamilton, 2003, p. 1804). Neumayer 
(2004) found some evidence in support of this claim and found resource abundance to be 
negatively correlated with net savings. Genuine saving is being increasingly used as a 
framework in which to interpret the resource curse (see Dietz, Neumayer, & de Soysa, 2007; 
Auty, 2007) and possibly represents a much better way of evaluating a country‘s encounter 
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with natural resource extraction than does economic growth. It also places education at the 
forefront of discussions on the resource curse.  
2.4 Natural Resources and Education 
As mentioned above, education has to varying degrees been focussed on as a potential mechanism for 
economic underperformance in natural resource dependent economies. Gylfason (2001) found that a 
high share of natural capital in national wealth was negative for education. He found similar findings 
using a range of measures for education and argued that human capital is crowded out by natural 
capital. Gylfason & Zoega (2006) also found natural resources to be negative for education and added 
that this effect was partially due to the quality of social institutions (Gylfason & Zoega, 2006, p. 
1107). Birdsall et al. (2001), using Auty‘s (1997) country categorisations, found that resource rich 
countries invested less in education and had poorer adult literacy when compared to resource poor 
countries. They argue that this is due to resource led growth as well as the typical increases in social 
inequality reducing the rate of return to educational investment resulting in a lack of demand. The 
general finding that education suffers in resource rich countries is also supported by Kronenberg 
(2004), who in his study of the transition economies of the former Soviet Union, found that the 
neglect of basic education (along with corruption) accounted for the poorer economic performance 
among resource rich countries. Papyrakis & Gerlagh (2004) also found education to be a factor in the 
poor growth of natural resource rich countries, but placed it behind general investment and lack of 
openness to trade in importance.  
2.5 Counter Arguments to the Curse Hypothesis 
Before going on to expand further on the possible mechanisms with the potential to impact on 
education, we should first point out that the idea of a natural resource curse does not go 
unchallenged. On the contrary, a body of research is emerging questioning the existence of a 
resource curse. Such studies have forwarded counterarguments to the resource curse 
hypothesis focussing mainly – although not exclusively3 – on growth studies rather than on 
development outcomes. Brunnschweiler (2008), for instance, found that by using subsoil 
wealth as a measure of resource abundance, natural resource abundance had a positive effect 
on growth. This finding is supported in Lederman & Maloney (2008) who made similar 
conclusions. Ding & Field (2005) found resource dependence to be negatively associated 
with growth, but found that resource endowment was positive for growth. Brunnschweiler & 
Bulte (2008) found not only that resource abundance was positive for growth; they also found 
resource dependence had no impact. Boyce & Herbert-Emery (2011) argue that income levels 
are more important than growth when discussing any possible curse. Using historical 
                                                     
3
 See Stijns 2006. Natural Resource Abundance and human capital accumulation. World Development 34:1060–
1083. 
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empirical data of US states they found resource abundance to be positively correlated with 
income levels while negatively correlated with growth. Stijns (2005) found both positive and 
negative effects of natural resource abundance on growth and argued that what was done with 
natural resources was more important than their existence or not. Stijns (2006) took the same 
measure of resource abundance and found natural resources to have positive effects on 
education. 
Central to many of the counterarguments to the curse hypothesis is the seeming 
interchangeable use of the terms ―natural resource abundance‖ and ―natural resource 
dependence‖. The basic argument is that, in studies supporting the curse hypothesis, the 
proxies used to measure resource abundance are in fact measures of resource dependence. 
Critics argue that resource dependence most likely does not result from an abundance of 
natural resources dwarfing all other types of economic activity; it more likely demonstrates 
the simple absence of other economic activities – the result of unsuccessful development of 
other sectors. They argue that countries with vast reserves of natural resources that have 
developed away from dependency on those resources, through industrialisation and the 
growth of knowledge based services, will be classified as resource poor. On the other hand, 
countries whose reserves are not so great, but have failed in their development in other 
sectors, will be classified as resource rich. Following this argument then, influential studies 
like Sachs and Warner (1995) are comparing the growth rates of countries who are already 
development failures (resource dependent) to those of the development winners (non-
resource dependent).  
This criticism makes a valid argument that requires further attention. It also has 
methodological implications for the current study that will be discussed further in section 4. 
One should bear in mind however, that the observation that countries that base their 
development on natural resources tend to perform poorly is not just based on a few recent 
empirical studies, but has rather been a subject that has warranted attention throughout 
history. 
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3. THEORETICAL MECHANISMS FOR A RESOURCE CURSE ON 
EDUCATION 
Below is an overview of some of the literature discussing the dynamics of the resource curse, 
as well as possible explanations regarding the impact of natural resources on education. 
Education is typically assigned its own category as a potential mechanism for the curse. Here, 
however, it is focussed on throughout, because of the fact that most of the other mechanisms 
– thought to transmit the curse on growth – can also have a more direct impact on education. 
The chapter finishes with an outline of the relationship of governance and institutions, and 
economic openness to natural resources and a discussion of their potential to mediate the 
effect of natural resources on education.  
3.1 Political Dutch Disease  
Dutch disease refers to the crowding out of other sectors – usually manufacturing – by natural 
resources. The resulting inflow of greater quantities of foreign currency drives up exchange 
rates, making the manufacturing sector relatively more costly and less attractive to foreign 
direct investment (FDI). Fluctuations in world commodity prices will, in turn, cause the 
country‘s exchange rate to become more volatile, further discouraging both foreign and 
domestic investment in manufacturing. The end result of these mechanisms could even be 
that total exports decrease despite an increase in exports of natural resources (Gylfason, 
2004).  
One of the indirect consequences of Dutch disease is considered to be a general sloth in 
government policy making (Sachs & Warner, 1995, 1998; Gylfason, 2004). Easy revenues 
from resource rents reduce the perceived need for developmental policy designed to ensure 
sustained future growth rates through education and skills promotion. The country‘s 
comparative advantage will be further embedded in its natural capital, because of reduced 
human capital stocks. This will, in turn, further reduce the perceived benefits from education 
spending for short-sighted governments (see Gylfason, 2001a).  
Additional consequences are seen through unemployment in the manufacturing sector. Since 
manufacturing generally creates significantly more employment – relative to investment – 
compared to the natural resource sectors, less manufacturing also means the loss of the 
positive spillovers associated with the sector. These are knowledge and skills acquisition that 
are easily transferable across industries and sectors. A workforce with a high level of this 
knowhow, and not just formal education, is considered to be important in attracting FDI and 
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facilitating technology transfers from other countries with successful research and 
development sectors. These positive effects are less prevalent in the natural resource sector 
since they generally create less employment, while the employment that is created is 
generally split between a few highly educated engineers and managers and the less skilled 
mine workers who would find it difficult to transfer their skills to other industries (Gylfason, 
2001a, p. 856). 
However, given that improvements in educational provision are always seen as positive for 
development, there is little reason why Dutch disease should impact on public commitment to 
education unless policy is impacted on by an irrational and/or short-sighted belief that 
education is less important in countries that are rich in natural resources. In other words, 
Dutch disease will only affect a government‘s decision regarding how much to spend on 
education, if the government is short-sighted enough to believe that sustained development 
can be attained without the widespread provision of good quality education. Additionally, for 
policy makers to see less reason to fund education, they would have to have resigned 
themselves to a permanent restructuring of the country‘s economy meaning a permanent 
decline in manufacturing. 
An alternative explanation could be that a decline in manufacturing and an increase in the 
importance of natural resource extraction would also see a shift in the relative influence of 
business elites in the two sectors. Those with investments in the manufacturing sector would 
soon have less lobbying power than those in the natural resource sector. Manufacturing elites 
and business associations would likely have been lobbying government for increased 
educational provision to provide a well-qualified workforce, because manufacturing in most 
cases (at least in developing countries) is labour intensive. Those with investments in natural 
resources would have less incentive to do so given that resource extraction is capital intensive 
and employs few workers.  
Those who have examined the reactions of policy makers to resource booms suggest a 
tendency towards over optimism that can lead to complacency (Gelb et al., 1988; Gylfason, 
2001b), while rationalist perspectives could explain the relative incentives for business 
lobbies to influence government spending policy. However, given the obvious benefits of 
education, for Dutch disease to have a negative impact, it appears that there needs to exist 
some other complementary dysfunctional features for policy makers to choose to deprioritise 
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educational funding. Dutch disease alone then cannot be sighted as the cause of bad policy. In 
fact, it is much more likely to result from bad policy.    
3.2 Civil War and Conflict 
Another popular area of study has been the relationship between natural resources and civil 
conflicts and wars. General trends from the literature suggest that natural resources can 
increase the likelihood and duration of conflict, because of fighting over resource rents, or 
through the rents providing increased capacity to continue fighting. Much of the civil war 
literature takes a rational actor perspective looking at the topic from the point of view of 
incentive (in this case gaining control of resources) and opportunity (the chances of being 
successful through taking up arms). In this vein, while natural resources can provide the 
incentive to take up arms, they could also prove to reduce the chances of success by 
providing the sitting government with the necessary funding to support a powerful military 
that would reduce the chances of success of a rebel uprising.  
Collier & Hoeffler (1998) made an important contribution to the civil war literature when 
they suggested that fighting to gain control of natural resources was an important determinant 
of civil war, rather than other popular explanations such as ethnic fractionalisation. However, 
the literature is not conclusive and new discoveries of natural resources have, in some cases, 
been seen to encourage an end to conflict (see Ross 2004 for an overview of some of the 
research on civil war and natural resources). Wick & Bulte (2006) even argue that, in the long 
run, conflict may be less detrimental to the overall economy than general low intensity rent 
seeking. Nevertheless, natural resource related conflict is widely agreed to be an important 
contributor to poor growth and continued underdevelopment, especially in Africa. In relation 
to human capital promotion, conflict may divert government spending to the police and 
military away from health and education, because of increased insecurity, or to simply 
maintain control over rents. However, this notion has not been tested empirically. 
3.3 Rent Seeking and Corruption  
A number of studies into the resource curse have devoted attention to increased rent seeking 
behaviour commonly associated with resource booms (Torvik, 2002; Wick & Bulte, 2006; & 
Hodler, 2006). Torvik (2002) suggests that increased rents available from natural resources 
divert entrepreneurial talent towards capturing those rents and away from more productive 
economic activities. Hodler‘s (2006) model proposes that increased fighting activities 
between groups over resource rents produces instability and inefficiencies, as well as 
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weakening property rights, and thus reduces economic performance. He states that this occurs 
predominately in fractionalised societies and not in homogenous ones.  
As an extension of general rent seeking, corruption is focused on as another of the ways in 
which the resource curse is brought about (see Leite & Weidermann, 2002; Mauro, 1998; 
Shaxon, 2007; Papyrakis & Gerlagh, 2004). Here, the larger potential resource rents give rent 
seekers greater incentives to bribe officials as a means of gaining access to rents from the 
resource. Furthermore, in the case of government controlled resources, politicians and 
officials may use their positions to themselves appropriate rents that could have been put to 
the good of the society and economy at large. Mauro (1998) argues that education spending 
provides less opportunity for rent seeking compared to other types of government spending 
and provides empirical evidence that education spending is lower in countries where 
corruption is more prevalent.  
3.3.1 Structural Implications of Rent-seeking 
At this point, we should perhaps make a distinction between corruption and rent-seeking. 
While corruption may be one way of gaining access to rents, rent-seeking in general can also 
occur in a formal setting adhering to a country‘s laws and regulations. Some explanations for 
the curse consider such a situation to give rise to a particular type of economic class of 
businessmen and women who exercise their entrepreneurial talent towards capturing rents 
rather than for more productive activities (Torvik, 2002). This may involve a significant 
number of firms working in the financial service sectors involved in brokering deals and 
facilitating investments, likely taking advantage of the personal links and alliances within the 
country‘s elite class.  
In most countries, either the state or large multinational companies – or a combination of the 
two – are responsible for the majority of natural resource extraction. This is due to the need 
for large capital inputs and specialist knowhow in the natural resource sector. In countries 
where foreign oil and mining companies account for the majority of natural resource 
extraction, these local firms and individuals will act as agents offering access to both official 
and informal environments that are difficult for outsiders to negotiate. At the same time other 
firms will set themselves up as suppliers of necessary inputs and services to the mining 
operations. Gaining such contracts may have less to do with market forces than with personal 
ties and connections. This will likely be especially true where state resource extraction 
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predominates, as these firms will take advantage of family and other links to officials and 
politicians for gaining lucrative contracts.  
Irrespective of who is responsible for the majority of natural resource production, the state 
almost always gains significant revenues from production, either directly through export 
revenues, or indirectly by means of taxes placed on exports. In the majority of cases 
governments use these rents to play an important role in the country‘s economic life through 
investments, subsidies and large scale projects of various types. This gives rise to an 
economic class that specialises in exploiting a relationship with the state in order to gain 
access to government spending directly funded from resource rents (Karl, 2004, p. 665). 
Those firms that are best suited to operating in such conditions are often those owned by a 
private elite of wealthy families and influential business groups, who while very adept at 
building successful business empires, are often of less benefit to a country‘s broad based 
social and economic development (Broad, 1995). Even in cases where business groups played 
an important role in successful periods of long-term economic development – as in the cases 
of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan – this occurred in resource poor countries where elites 
were forced to engage in more competitive manufacturing for export in order to create wealth 
(see Amsden, 1997; Morikawa, 1997). Key to their success was autonomous active 
government that was comparatively free to follow independent policies, as well as to 
negotiate and collaborate with domestic business elites from a strong position and with the 
objective of increasing welfare through economic growth (Stiglitz, 1996; Fields, 1997).  
The success of these countries is often contrasted to the poor economic performance of Latin 
American countries, where government policies failed to foster efficiency improvements in 
industry, and careless macro-economic policies were more common. One observation made 
of the Latin American experience has been a lack of government independence from 
powerful elite business interests, which favoured the status quo of protectionism. An 
important observation of the East Asia experience is a lack of any significant natural 
resources (Auty, 1994). This in turn meant a comparative lack of rents available to be 
captured. It also meant an alignment of interests of business, government and the wider 
society that educational provision be improved and expanded in order to provide skilled 
workers for an expanding manufacturing sector.   
Domestic business commonly predominates in the import and commercial sectors. 
Furthermore, because of the tendency for manufacturing to be crowded out in natural 
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resource dependent economies, any manufacturing that does take place will likely be 
dependent on closed trade policies, subsidies and other forms of preferential treatment. As a 
result, manufacturing will likely be inefficient and dependent on government favour for 
survival (Auty, 2001c; Karl, 2004). If countries were to move towards a more diversified 
competitive industrial economy, such groups would likely lose their advantageous positions 
both in economic and political terms.  
From the issues discussed above, we can begin to paint a picture of the development of an 
economic structure where elites are in fact dependent, not only on the rents obtained from 
natural resource extraction; but on resource dependence itself. In the absence of resource 
dependence, the power of these interest groups would be reduced by the emergence of 
manufacturing firms who would try to influence government policy to favour their interests 
over those of others. As such, elites in resource dependent countries will likely have an 
interest in preserving the status quo. The development of such an economic environment 
would appear to be further bolstered by the economic distortions associated with natural 
resources like Dutch disease, making the likelihood of this kind of scenario emerging even 
more probable. As such, an oligopolistic variety of capitalism where privileged unproductive 
business groups dominate has been increasingly linked to natural resource based development 
(Auty, 2001c).  
In such a system, education may suffer for two reasons. Firstly, the powerful interest groups 
have little interest in pushing the government for more investment in education, as it does not 
directly benefit the areas of business they themselves are involved in. Secondly, due to the 
fact that their position in society is cemented by a government that represents their interests 
over those of the poor majority, increased political participation (a common result of a better 
educated populace) would risk losing this control. Then the end result may be then the 
emergence of an econo-political structure that is at odds with adequate educational provision. 
3.4 Natural Resources and the State 
One of the areas thus far neglected here in the discussion on rents has been the nature of the 
state itself.  This shift of focus recognises that the rents from natural resources do not only 
have the potential to affect the behaviour and incentives of individuals within and without 
government and the economic and political structure in which they operate. In fact they can 
change the nature of the state itself, both formally in its shape and its role in public life, and 
fundamentally in its purpose regarding society and development. Research is this direction 
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however, is not an alternative explanation to those offered above, it is rather a shift of 
emphasis that sees the state as a more dynamic entity, as opposed to a more static structural 
actor (see Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008).  
The state centred explanation for a resource curse is that resource rich countries tend to 
cultivate political states that are less equipped – or even less motivated – to facilitate the 
country‘s sustained economic and social development. Researchers have identified a 
tendency among resource dependent states to be less democratic, as well as being non-
developmental in outlook, preferring to govern the distribution of rents rather than facilitating 
development through regulation, investment and the impartial rule of law.  
3.4.1 The Rentier State 
Taking the rents approach a step further, a number of scholars have suggested that natural 
resources are associated with the emergence of a certain type of political state, referred to as a 
―rentier state‖ (see Mahdavy, 1970; Karl, 2004; Skocpol, 1982; Beblawi, 1987; Ross, 2001a). 
The term in its current usage was brought into vogue by Mahdavy and later Beblawi – both 
scholars of Middle East area studies. Karl (2004, p. 661) defines rentier states generally as ―a 
state that lives from externally generated rents rather than from the surplus production of the 
population‖. Beblawi (1987, p. 51) also argued that an important component of a rentier state 
is that the majority of those who come into contact with the rents do so at the time of 
distribution, while only a few are responsible for its production. In other words rentier states 
are characterised by large bureaucracies specialised in the spending and distributing rents – 
rather than collecting taxes from the general population – as rents substitute for taxes in the 
state budget. Low taxes then tend to be an important component of rentier states and natural 
resource dependent economies (Ross, 2001a, p. 332). 
Rentier states are focussed on in the resource curse literature for two main reasons. One is 
that natural resource rich rentier states are associated with lower levels of democracy and 
even authoritarian regimes (Ross, 2001a). The second is that governments of rentier states are 
associated with weak industrial policymaking and a general lack of developmentalism seen as 
a necessary precondition for long-term development (Auty, 2001c). 
3.5 Democracy and Regime Type 
A number of studies have shown a positive correlation of greater democracy and education 
spending (Lindert, 2004; Rudra & Haggard, 2005; Stasavage, 2005; Kaufman & Segura-
Ubiergo, 2001). Although there is some variation in explanation, most theories rest on the 
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principal that: as democracy increases, the middle and working classes become the median 
voters, and politicians must therefore comply with their demands for education provision. If 
resource dependent states were shown to be less democratic then, that would offer a potential 
explanation for any poor performance in the area of education. 
The literature points to four principal mechanisms with the potential to make rentier resource 
rich states less democratic and more authoritarian. The following section draws heavily from 
Ross (2001a, pp. 332-337) who refers to three of these mechanisms as the Rentier Effect, the 
Repression Effect, and the Modernisation Effect. He also points out that they are not mutually 
exclusive and all focus on rents as an intrinsic factor in retarding democratisation. Ross 
concludes that a combination of the three probably conspire to make resource dependent 
countries less democratic. The fourth mechanism relates to the way in which natural 
resources condition the relationship between foreign powers and the state of the resource rich 
country. The argument is that foreign powers will generally play a more negative role in 
countries with natural resources because of pragmatic self-interested behaviour.   
At this point it would seem important to point out that the relationship between democracy 
and education is slightly ambiguous because each would seem to benefit from improvements 
in the other. So while it is likely to find a strong correlation between the two, the direction of 
causality will be harder to discern. This point has relevance for the present study and will be 
returned to in chapter two. Greater levels of democracy are likely to bring about more 
investment in education since societies will usually ask for more to be spent in this area. 
Better educated citizens will also be better placed to hold politicians and governments to 
account thus further strengthening democracy. This kind or virtuous cycle, however, suggests 
the possibility of a two-way causality in multivariate regressions focussing on the relationship 
between democracy and education (see Dahl, 1956 and Lipset, 1959).   
3.5.1 Repression 
The most obvious and simplest explanation for a lack of democracy in natural resource 
dependent countries is repression. A government has easy access to rents that is uses to fund 
increases in security spending and extend its monopoly on violence – the muscle behind 
antidemocratic policies. However, this does not explain the initial root of the state‘s 
authoritarianism. This could result for two main reasons. The first explanation is that 
powerful interest groups wish to capture the state to further their own interests of enriching 
themselves by appropriating rents through corruption and other means. Their authoritarian 
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policies then, are simply to prevent descent and challenges from the general population who 
are witness to the unequal distribution of rents. Secondly, and in slight variation to the first 
mechanism, governments of resource rich countries – or groups that control them – fear 
military challenges from other interest groups that wish to gain control of the country‘s 
lucrative resources. This is supported by several studies that show a connection between civil 
war and natural resources (de Soysa, 2002; Collier & Hoeffler, 1998). Increasing the size of 
security forces under its control reduces the apparent feasibility – an important factor in the 
decision to go to war (Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohner, 2009) – of other actors capturing the state 
through violent means. In some cases those in power will have, themselves, gained power 
through civil war and are therefore wary of losing their hold on the state in the same way. 
Neither would it make sense to relinquish their hold on the state through democratic elections 
if their motivation for the conflict was not democracy in the first place. Smith (2004) finds 
that while oil does tend to make regimes more durable, this durability cannot be fully 
explained through a repression mechanism. Smith‘s view is challenged to some degree, 
however, by de Soysa & Binningsbø (2009) who found natural resources to play a role in 
state repression.    
3.5.2 The Rentier Effect 
The rentier effect on democracy is the idea that states use rents to avoid demands for greater 
democracy from the general public. The argument for this is based mainly on two proposed 
mechanisms: firstly, low taxes; and secondly, paternalistic increases in public spending aimed 
at buying acquiescence. Low taxes are considered to be important because a very low tax rate 
is considered to make government less accountable. The idea is that people will demand more 
rights and representation when their taxes are high, or increase, and so become more engaged 
in politics. The second component simply assumes that lavish public spending will convince 
the general population that democratic reform is unnecessary by reducing discontent and 
removing one possible incentive to demand reform. Ross (2001) finds evidence that oil – and 
to a lesser extent mineral – dependent countries are more authoritarian partly through the 
rentier state mechanism. 
Both mechanisms also have the potential to impact on education spending. If people are less 
likely to demand democracy because of lower taxes, they will also likely be less fervent in 
their demands for more investment in education. On the other hand, if governments do try to 
buy off their citizens through spending, then one area they may choose to increase spending 
could be education as this would likely be popular with citizens. However, if the reason for 
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the increase in public spending is to avoid demands for democratic reform – given that more 
educated populations are more likely to demand democracy (Lipset, 1959; Barro, 1999) – 
education is unlikely to be the area where authoritarian governments choose to invest. 
3.5.3 Failed Modernisation 
One of the clearest explanations for why resource dependent countries tend to be less 
democratic is presented by modernisation theory. According to the thesis, a prerequisite for 
countries to become more democratic is economic development through industrialisation 
involving greater levels of urbanisation and education (Lipset, 1959).  Lipsett, however, also 
pointed out the importance of legitimacy in a democratic system and that legitimacy did not 
necessarily exist because of economic development. However, this nuance suggested by 
Lipsett was given a backseat by a generation of modernisation researchers who commonly 
presented a linear or curvilinear relationship between economic development and democracy, 
a view that has subsequently been criticised (see Arat, 1988).  
Studies of democracy have suggested that natural resources may represent the missing 
variable explaining low levels of democracy (Lam & Wantchekon, 2003; Jensen & 
Wantchekon, 2004; Ross 2001a). A mechanism proposed along the logic of the 
modernisation thesis is that natural resources tend to push out manufacturing with its 
propensity to occupational specialisation and investment in education (Ross, 2001a, pp. 336-
337). 
A mechanism proposed in Auty (2000, pp. 350-355) largely follows the modernisation thesis 
suggesting that the onset of labour intensive industrialisation is key to both democracy and 
wider development. According to the model, the employment created by labour intensive 
manufacturing promotes urbanisation and in turn reduces wage inequality because it reduces 
the drag that a large unemployed rural population creates on wages. The expansion of 
manufacturing results in rapid skills accumulation, both through on-the-job learning and by 
encouraging individual workers, the state and the private sector to invest in training. This 
reduces the wage premium on skills further compressing wages and reducing inequality in the 
middle sector of society. Here, democracy is promoted in a number of ways. Firstly, the more 
educated population will demand a greater participation in decision making; Secondly, the 
government‘s tax revenues will depend more on taxes on individuals wages leading to calls 
for accountability for how these revenues are spent; Thirdly, greater income equality in the 
middle sector of society raises trust and social capital accumulation supporting consensual 
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and less polarised approaches to government resource allocation; Fourth, the manufacturing 
lobby is bolstered at the expense of rent-seeking interest groups. Manufacturers will call for 
more investment in education further promoting democracy.  
Auty (2000) suggests that such a scenario is more likely in a resource poor country, since 
resource poor countries tend to implement policies towards early industrialisation at a much 
lower per capita income. According to this idea then, for a given per capita income, natural 
resource dependent countries will likely be less democratic and invest less in education than 
countries that are lacking in natural resources. Furthermore, resource rich countries have 
tended to skip the labour intensive stage of industrialisation choosing to invest directly in 
heavy industry with the proceeds gained from natural resources. This was the case in the ISI 
period in Latin America, where capital intensive industrialisation failed to provide extensive 
employment and never reached a level of international competitiveness.  
3.6 Governance, Institutions and the Developmental State 
We have seen from the themes discussed above, and generally from the development 
literature that economic development, democracy, education, and good governance are bound 
together in a way that requires some kind of virtuous cyclicity for positive outcomes to occur 
in each. The other variable of great importance that has the potential drive both virtuous as 
well as vicious cycles are the collective and individual efforts of politicians through state 
policymaking. While there is still considerable ideological disagreement surrounding the 
optimal degree of participation that a state should play in a country‘s economy, it is also clear 
that no country in history has achieved long-term developmental success without some kind 
of targeted government policy aimed at facilitating improvement.  
3.6.1 Developmentalism 
Countries as diverse as Sweden, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Switzerland can all site 
as intrinsic the state‘s role in their successful economic development. Whether this involved 
considerable state involvement in the economy and support for national industry as occurred 
in Sweden and Taiwan, the strong system of incentives for efficiency improvements as was 
the case in Japan and South Korea, or the liberalising policies and legal frameworks that 
support the financial sectors in Singapore and Switzerland, all of these countries demonstrate 
a central role of the state in facilitating development. Some form of developmental state then 
would seem to be an indispensible component for successful durable economic and social 
development (Wade, 1990). A key component in this would have to be a degree of state 
autonomy from powerful interests from both within and without the country, enabling 
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alignment with the interests of the majority of citizens whose standard of living is ultimately 
the measure of any country‘s development.   
Some scholars – the most vocal of them being Richard Auty – have long argued that the 
biggest problem that has faced natural resource dependent countries has been their inability to 
engender developmental states. This may be because natural resource dependent countries 
tend to develop the kind of parasitic states that have been captured by elites as mentioned in 
proceeding sections of this chapter. The other explanation is that well-meaning governments 
of resource rich countries, that try to be developmental, often end up enacting misguided 
overoptimistic policies that are negative in the long run (Gelb et al. 1988). If this is the case, 
the complexity of recent histories of most resource dependent countries may indicate a 
combination of the two. 
Auty (2001c) argues that developmental states tend not to develop in natural resource 
dependent countries for the following reasons: Firstly that the poor majority in resource poor 
countries have a lower tolerance for rent seeking behaviour and the inequitable distribution of 
assets. This makes it more likely that politically minded states will align themselves with the 
interests of the poorer majority. Secondly, scarcity of resources necessarily requires the 
efficient use of those resources that are present. The abundant rents from natural resource 
extraction allow wasteful or risky spending practices to go on for longer in resource rich 
countries. This is evidenced by the large ambitious infrastructure projects that often ended in 
disaster during oil windfalls, because of poor planning and risk assessment (Gelb, 1988, p. 
117). Thirdly, resource poor countries are less likely to experience Dutch disease that can 
lead governments to enact more closed trade policies in order to protect industry. While 
developmental states have used tariffs, quotas and other such mechanisms in the past (see 
South Korea and Japan) as good examples, this was done to protect industry in its infancy 
that was rapidly maturing towards competitiveness on the world market, rather than to protect 
industry that had become inefficient with little prospect of improvement (Dicken, 2003, p. 
175). The trade policy closure in resource rich countries may even be related to protecting the 
interests of influential business elites who have little interest in competing with foreign 
companies on an open market. Fourth, the mechanism described above as the ―failed 
modernisation effect‖ on democracy describes how government policy, economic 
development and democracy can be closely bound together. The kind of state described in the 
failed modernisation mechanism is clearly not developmental in outlook. It is passive rather 
than being active in policy making, it is answerable to a predatory self-interested business 
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elite instead of to the poor majority, and is short-sighted with spending as opposed to forward 
thinking with investments. 
An important factor that should not be forgotten is that just because a tendency has been 
identified, that is not to say that poor policy is an automatic consequence of natural resource 
abundance or even dependence. A policy is at its core a decision of how to achieve a goal or 
how to overcome a problem. Those who make those decisions do not do so in a bubble. They 
are likely more conscious than most of the dangers associated with natural resource driven 
development. So with enough political will, there is the potential to enact policies to 
overcome these dangers.  
This viewpoint is supported by the experiences of a small number of countries who have 
turned their natural resources to their advantage quite spectacularly. Norway, through careful 
management of its considerable oil revenues has raised the living standards is its population 
and consistently sits on top of the United Nations human development index. Botswana, 
while starting from a much lower level of development, used its vast diamond reserves to 
stimulate a period of very high growth over the last three decades. It has also managed to 
transmit this growth into real improvements for its population (Iimi, 2007a). Key to both 
countries‘ successes has been efforts to limit the quantity of rents flooding into the economy. 
This was achieved by channelling most of the revenues into international investment funds. 
This has the added benefit of sterilising government revenues and protecting the state budget 
from economic shock, such as those caused by steep fluctuations in commodity prices.  
Another feature in both countries has been targeted investment in human capital. Norway has 
invested highly in education which is free at all levels including the higher level and 
Botswana has the highest rate of school enrolment in Africa. While both countries still 
exhibit some problems associated with natural resources – both countries have appeared to 
show some signs of Dutch disease (Iimi 2007; Larsen, 2005), and other sectors have not gone 
entirely unaffected by the primary sector – they have managed to avoid the most serious of 
the potential negative externalities associated with natural resources through the 
developmentalist policies of their governments. One could argue that discoveries of vast 
quantities of natural resources in these two countries occurred within special social and 
political contexts. However favourable these contexts may have been though, their 
manifestation was ultimately successful development policy. These types of policies could be 
emulated by other states, if only they could develop the political will and/or autonomy to do 
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so. One of these key policy areas is investment in human capital through education. 
Commitment to education then would appear to be as good a measure as any of a state‘s 
commitment to development.  
3.6.2 Good Governance and Institutions 
One of the most prominent explanations regarding the divergent experiences of the few 
natural resource success stories compared to the majority of failures lies in differences in 
institutional quality between countries.  Although Sachs & Warner (1995) found that an 
effect of natural resources on institutional quality did not explain the curse on growth, a 
number of more recent studies have contradicted these findings. Robinson, Torvik, & Verdier 
(2006) find that the quality of institutions represents a key deciding factor regarding whether 
countries suffer the curse or not. They argue that the curse occurs because of incentives for 
harmful self-interested behaviour created by rents. Countries with institutions that constrain 
such behaviour, by holding government and politicians accountable, will tend to escape the 
curse. Kolstad & Wiig (2009) forward the same general argument while introducing the term 
―impartiality enhancing institutions‖. Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik (2006) also found 
institutions to be a key component of the curse, as did Boshchini, Pettersson, & Roine, 
(2007), Collier & Goeris (2007), Butkiewicz & Yanikkaya (2010) and Dietz et al. (2007).  
At the same time a number of studies have argued that natural resource abundance itself 
reduces the quality of institutions. Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian (2003) assert that the 
negative consequences caused by natural resources – especially oil – are transmitted though 
the negative impact they have on institutions. Arezki & van der Ploeg (2007) find worse 
institutions to be a side-effect of natural resource abundance, while Gylfason and Zoega 
(2006) suggest that part of the effect of natural resources on growth occurs through 
institutions. 
The subtle difference in interpretation here is likely mainly due to explanation of causality. A 
number of studies have clearly demonstrated that resource dependence is associated with 
poor institutional quality. However, it is less clear whether natural resources cause poor 
institutions to develop, or whether countries that happen to have poor institutions suffer the 
curse because they are less prepared to deal with pressures exerted by resource booms. The 
answer is likely that both assertions are correct to some degree. It is clear that resource 
dependent countries have not developed their institutions as well over time as have other 
countries, not dependent on natural resources. However, there is less clear evidence that 
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natural resource discovery actually corrupted and weakened institutions and there is certainly 
no evidence that good institutions became bad after a country‘s natural resource discovery. 
The key factor would appear to be the quality of a county‘s institutions prior to the resource 
boom. A comparison of Norway to the majority of other natural resource producers would 
appear to support this claim. On the other hand the experience of Botswana shows that 
institutional improvement is not impossible after the discovery of the resources and the 
ensuing resource boom. However, Botswana stands out as a marked exception and most 
natural resource dependent countries appear to have had the development of their institutions 
hampered by their natural resources. 
3.7 Economic Openness and Education 
A significant quantity of literature is available regarding the potential for economic 
integration to influence public spending (see Dreher, Sturm, & Ursprung, 2008; Rudra & 
Haggard 2005; Rodrik 1997). Some studies have also narrowed their focus to the impact of 
such processes on education spending (e.g. Ansell, 2008). Such studies have great 
significance for the globalisation debate and may also provide clues regarding the 
relationship of education spending to natural resources. The following section provides an 
overview of some of the literature that may prove useful for the present study.  
Critics of globalisation have argued that openness leads to a process in which a national 
government‘s policy autonomy is eroded, as spending is constrained by the need to be 
competitive in the global economic system. Governments must reduce taxation levels in order 
to retain or attract investment due to fewer restrictions on capital flows. As a result, social 
spending, including education spending, may have to be cut. While these concerns are often 
debated in the rich welfare states, they are equally applicable to developing countries. In a 
study of developing countries, Kaufman & Segura-Ubiergo (2001) found openness to trade to 
be inversely correlated with social spending due to more austere fiscal policies. This claim is 
known as the ―disciplining or efficiency hypothesis‖ and sits within the general race to the 
bottom argument.  
Critics of this position argue that it regards national policy to be solely the product of global 
economic pressures and fails to recognise the impact of domestic political negotiation 
between actors. It is argued that since increased openness to the restructuring effects of 
globalisation will have negative consequences for some sectors (creating winners and losers 
from globalisation), those sectors will demand to be compensated Rodrik (1997). This 
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―compensation hypothesis‖ argues that political parties must, to some degree, acquiesce to 
the demands of the median voter. Such arguments are based on the model developed in 
Meltzer & Richard (1981). While this approach works best for democratic systems that 
respond to the demands of an electorate free from coercion, more dictatorial governments 
also need to consolidate their positions through some degree of public spending. This is 
supported by the fact that the costs involved in losing power, are likely to be much greater in 
an undemocratic system.  
The available evidence on the openness discussion appears to be ambiguous. Empirical work 
by Dreher et al. (2008), for instance, found no robust connection between globalisation and 
the composition of government expenditure. Rudra & Haggard (2005), in their study on 
welfare spending in less developed countries, also found no evidence of a globalisation 
effect, although they did find that education spending was the sector ―most vulnerable to 
external pressures‖ (Rudra & Haggard, 2005, p. 1038). While the possibility does exist that 
neither the disciplining nor the compensation hypotheses hold water, it is also possible that 
both are valid and merely cancel each other out. This may occur at a case level where 
external pressure to cut spending is counteracted by domestic pressure to increase welfare. It 
may also be true that each may be pervasive in different cases, making identification of a 
single trend difficult through cross country empirical comparisons.  
The available evidence on the impact of trade openness on the resource curse is unfortunately 
just as ambiguous. A number of studies have argued that trade policy closure has played a 
role in partially explaining the poor economic performance of resource dependent economies 
(Sachs & Warner, 1995; Arezki & van der Ploeg, 2007; and Papryrakis & Gerlagh, 2004). 
This supports influential studies from the globalisation debate like Dollar & Kraay (2001) 
who found trade to be good for growth. On the other hand, Butkiewicz & Yanikkaya (2010) 
find that openness to trade is correlated to poor growth in mineral dependent economies and 
Garfinkel, Skaperdas, & Syropoulos, 2008) present a model suggesting that some oil 
exporters will tend to lose under free trade.   
Birdsall & Hamoudi (2002) contribute to the discussion by questioning the direction of 
causality of openness and growth. They argue that a decline in openness to trade in resource 
dependent countries was a result of the stagnation they suffered during the 1980s because 
they did not have the income to finance imports. This was represented statistically as an 
overall decline in trade, which was correlated to their stagnation. However, the stagnation 
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began at a point when resource dependent economies were trading more. Birdsall and 
Hamoudi‘s observation questions the findings of some of the studies that find closure to trade 
acts as a component of the curse. It also questions the findings in Dollar & Kraay‘s oft cited 
paper, in that they claim some of the negative result for non-traders was driven by the fact 
that natural resource producers‘ sudden lack of trade was more related to commodity prices 
and less to do with their openness to trade (Birdsall & Hamoudi, 2002).  
Given that natural resource dependent economies are often less democratic, perhaps of most 
interest to the present study are theories which consider the interaction effect of democracy 
and openness, (see Ansell, 2008; Bourguignon & Verdier, 2000; Falkinger & Grossmann, 
2005; Rudra & Haggard, 2005). Ansell (2008) finds that openness and democracy in 
conjunction are positive for education spending. Rudra & Haggard (2005) did not find an 
increase in education spending in democracies open to trade. However, they did find 
liberalisation among authoritarian countries did produce a drop in education spending. This 
supports the idea that authoritarian governments react to the external pressures of 
globalisation unconstrained by domestic political dissent. This trend is supported by 
Bourguignon & Verdier‘s (2000) model which predicts that in a closed economy, oligarchic 
capitalists may have an interest in investing in more education, as it can increase their profits. 
In an open system, they have no such interest, because the returns from subsidising education 
are less given that the educated workers would demand higher wages in the open market. The 
more educated population also threaten their political control. This idea is supported by 
Falkinger & Grossman (2005) who traced historical development in Latin America‘s resource 
dependent economies. They argue that economic liberalisation delayed democratisation by 
reducing investment in education by the land and mine owning oligarchy. While they had an 
economic incentive to open up to trade, they had a political incentive to limit education in 
order to maintain their power. Additionally, they had no economic incentive to invest in 
education that would have been the case in a closed economic system. While Falkinger & 
Grossman (2005) add that the ideal combination for structural change is economic 
liberalisation in conjunction with a democratic system, they conclude that natural resource 
based economies should not undertake economic liberalisation without first undergoing a 
process of democratisation. 
3.8 Natural Resources and Education in Light of Theoretical Mechanisms 
In summary of the theoretical discussions above, there seem to be a number of reasons why 
natural resources could cause governments to invest less in education. These appear to be 
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related to: (a) a lack of incentive to invest in education for short and medium term economic 
reasons, (b) a lower political incentive to invest in education, and (c) a political incentive not 
to invest in education. Since there are few positive reasons to limit investment in education, 
the reason for doing so will, therefore, be likely due to irrational behaviour, or rational self-
interest. The first is explained mainly by behaviourist perspectives and contemplates a 
scenario of a well-meaning government behaving imprudently, either because of over 
optimism – the belief that striking oil negates the need for good development policy – or 
because of distortionary economic pressures – the Dutch disease mechanism. Either way the 
government foolishly discounts the future by not prioritising investment in education. It is not 
clear how much explanatory potential this idea has since it requires us to accept that 
governments are generally: a) well-meaning, and b) imprudent and behave irrationally, since 
the government would have to deprioritise education because of a perception that education is 
less important for the economy than other types of public spending.  
The second principal area is explained by more rational choice perspectives and is related to 
controlling rents and rent-seeking, as well as maintaining political power. These ideas are 
related to the rational actions of self-interested elites with the objective of self-enrichment 
and maintaining power, and may be related to a country‘s level of democracy. The principal 
mechanisms are summarised below:     
1. Due to a lack of manufacturing in resource dependent countries, influential elites, 
with the power to influence state spending policy, have less incentive to push the 
government to invest in education. In fact, they may have incentives to limit 
educational provision. 
2. Rent seeking and corruption prevalent in many resource rich states may direct 
spending away from education since education spending gives less opportunities for 
rent seeking than larger infrastructure and military spending projects.   
3. Political leaders and influential elites in undemocratic resource rich states will have 
less incentive to invest in education, as this would likely strengthen the public‘s 
demand for democracy over time. They may also divert spending away from 
education towards funding and large military and police force designed to maintain 
their hold on power.  
4. Taxes are commonly lower in resource dependent countries. This is because 
Governments in resource dependent countries commonly use resource rents to fund 
the public budget meaning that lower taxes are usual. This also reduces public 
32 
 
pressure for spending increases since tax payers are likely to demand value for their 
taxes.  
By looking at these issues as a whole, there appears to be a strong possibility that any 
negative impact from natural resources on education spending will be cumulative, occur 
indirectly, and be the result of any of several possible mechanisms. This also suggests that 
pinpointing the exact causes of any curse through cross-country empirical tests may be 
difficult. However, while it may not be possible to pinpoint exact mechanisms, there is 
enough reason to believe that natural resource rents – and/or economic pressures – may 
impact on the decisions of governments regarding investment in education. This claim 
warrants testing, especially in the light of recent challenges the resource curse hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Education spending in countries where resource rents are high will be 
comparatively lower than in countries where rents are less. 
Based in the literature, there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that good governance 
reduces the effect of any resource curse. There is even more evidence that institutions are of 
particular importance and that countries with good institutions can escape the curse.  
Hypothesis 2: Better governance and institutions mitigate any negative effect of natural 
resources. 
The potential for economic openness to influence education spending is, on the other hand, 
somewhat ambiguous. There exist theoretical arguments for why openness may be positive, 
or negative, for education spending. There are also reasons why openness may reduce, or 
worsen any natural resource effect. Openness is therefore assigned two conflicting 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3a: Greater economic openness will mitigate any negative effect of natural 
resources. 
Hypothesis 3b: Greater economic openness will exacerbate any negative effect of natural 
resources. 
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
4.1 Methodology 
The subject of how natural resources impact on development outcomes can be approached in 
a variety of ways. Given the continued controversy of the topic, studies of the resource curse 
hypothesis generally employ quantitative cross-sectional designs in order to test the 
hypothesis and explore potential mechanisms. The variation usually involves substituting 
variables intended as indicators, as well as adapting models, in an attempt to improve on the 
reliability and validity of results from previous studies. While a number of studies have 
sought to document how natural resources negatively impact on single countries (see, for 
example Karl, 1987 and Broad, 1995), or even smaller locations like individual communities, 
the resource curse debate is fundamentally related to the identification of a dominant trend 
across countries. In addition, the resource curse hypothesis is itself the product of an 
observation derived from such studies (that resource rich countries tend to grow slower than 
resource poor countries). In this context, entering into the debate requires a certain degree of 
similarity in approach. In order to test the specific hypotheses presented above then, it will be 
necessary to employ a research design that can capture large trends where findings are 
replicable and can be outwardly generalised.  
The philosophical drawbacks and advantages of this approach, as well as those of its 
epistemological foundations, are well known and have been discussed at length elsewhere 
(see Freedman, 2010 and, for a critical view Mckeown, 1999). It is sufficient to say then that 
while such a study will be at a disadvantage in attributing causality to observed patterns, it 
will always be necessary to document such patterns before expending time and effort on 
explaining them more fully. In the present context this requires a body of research to 
substantiate, or contradict, a negative correlation between natural resources and education, 
before thorough investigations can be made to explain such a trend. Moreover, common 
sense and an attention to theory are useful tools that can aid us in discounting the least 
credible causal mechanisms.   
4.2 Estimation Method 
The model is based in cross-country time-series regressions using data running from 1980 – 
2006 and is estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS). All countries are included where 
data is available and which have populations of over 1 million inhabitants. Most regression 
models are run twice, once including all available countries and a second time just including 
developing countries. Newey-West standard errors are used to reduce the problem of 
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heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of error terms, inherent in time-series analyses of this 
type where data is pooled across countries and over time. However, in one model the Newey-
West errors are dropped in favour of including the lagged dependent variable as a regressor in 
the model. The lagged dependent is the previous year‘s education spending as a percentage of 
GNI and is represented as L.EDUCATION%gni in the tables. The reason for including the 
lagged variable is to guard against the possibility that autocorrelation is biasing the results 
and due to omitted variables bias. Since an unknown explanatory variable would also be 
correlated to a similar degree with the previous year‘s education spending, the lagged 
dependent variable works as a good proxy to control for the effect of any unknown variable 
causing specification bias (Baker 2007).  The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in 
the basic model is a very conservative strategy.  A year dummy is also employed to control 
for time related fixed effects.  
4.3 Operationalisation and Variable Information 
The study examines the indirect role of natural resources as factors that have the potential to 
influence the education spending policy of governments. Due to the wide availability and 
accessibility of data for most of the variables employed, the size of the sample of countries is 
large at 125 countries and covers the period from 1980 – 2006. The number of observations 
available of course varies with the country availability of each variable for each year. 
Countries with populations of less than one million are purposely excluded however. It is 
likely that these countries will exhibit characteristics particular to very small countries that 
would exert a disproportionate influence on the results of this study.  
4.3.1 Towards a Conceptual Understanding of a Natural Resources Variable 
Much of the disagreement regarding the idea of a curse of natural resources is related to the 
variables researchers have tended to employ as indicators for resource abundance – the most 
common way being primary export intensity. Sachs & Warner (1995) began this trend by 
using primary exports as a percentage of national wealth as a proxy for resource abundance. 
Subsequent studies have found evidence for a curse based on the same or similar measures of 
resource abundance that involve gauging the economic role of natural resources in relation to 
the rest of the economy. The principal of these alternatives being: mineral production as a 
percentage of GDP, and the proportion of exports made up of primary exports. Gylfason 
(2001b) takes a slightly different tack by employing a measure of the primary sector‘s share 
in the labour market as an indicator of resource abundance. The principal argument however, 
against any of these measures as indicators of resource abundance, is that such measures 
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indicate a country‘s dependence on natural resources rather than measuring abundance (see 
Stijns, 2005). Furthermore, measuring natural resources as a percentage amount of GDP 
means problems of endogeneity for growth studies (Brunnscheiler & Bulte, 2008, p. 249).  
Critics of the hypothesis also argue that countries will generally show up as natural resource 
dependent, not as a result of an abundance of natural resources, but rather because of the 
limited size of other sectors of the economy. As a result, any country that has failed through 
its development to engender expansion in other more advanced sectors – such as 
manufacturing or knowledge based services – will inevitably depend to a greater extent on 
any natural resources they have, be they great or limited in gross per capita terms (Alexeev & 
Conrad, 2009). Conversely, countries that possess vast quantities of natural resources in gross 
per capita terms, but have successfully developed other sectors to the point where an 
expansion of overall income has diminished the proportional role of natural resources, will 
appear resource poor using such measures. Put another way, comparing natural resource 
dependent countries to non-dependent countries is akin to comparing development failures to 
the development success stories (Wright & Czelusta, 2004, p. 7).  
Brunnschweiler (2008) points out that the best way we currently have of quantifying wealth 
is GDP per capita. Therefore, any way of assessing natural resource wealth must also be a per 
capita wealth measure and not a percentage intensity measure that gauges dependence. 
Furthermore, even gross per capita natural resource income could be misleading as a measure 
of natural resource abundance, as it demonstrates natural resource production rather than 
actually showing the amount of natural resources a country possesses within its boundaries 
(Brunnschweiler, 2008, p. 400-401). For this reason, some studies have utilised data on 
subsoil reserve estimates available from the World Bank, arguing that they represent the 
closest approximation available of natural resource abundance. By using this or similar data a 
number of studies have found evidence to support an argument against any resource curse 
and have in fact found some evidence of a positive effect of natural resources on economic 
growth (Brunnschweiler, 2008; Brunnscheiler & Bulte, 2008; Ding & Field, 2005), and 
investment in human capital (Stijns, 2006), in cross country studies. 
The arguments raised above clearly point out a weakness in a portion of the early resource 
curse literature. There is clearly a problem of validity in using a measure of the relative 
economic role of natural resources as an indicator for endowment. In short, the concept of 
abundance is not properly reflected by measures of dependency. This would be particularly 
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true if – as the critics of the curse hypothesis claim – this discrepancy were systematically 
biased towards producing a particular result.  
However, the solution proposed above for measuring natural resource abundance may also be 
still somewhat unsatisfactory. The logic for changing indicators is based on the fact that the 
previous measures that claimed to demonstrate resource abundance were in fact indicating 
resource dependence. The best approach then must surely be to switch to a better indicator of 
resource abundance. On the other hand, if we are to learn more about the dynamics regarding 
any impact of natural resources on development, it may not be so wise to discard dependence 
altogether. Firstly, while it is true that underdeveloped countries are more likely to depend on 
their natural resources because of a lack of alternative economic activity, it would be naïve to 
suggest that the gross quantity of natural resources has no impact on dependence at all. After 
all, a country lacking any kind of natural resources whatsoever, will show up as resource poor 
in under any indicator of abundance no matter how successful or unsuccessful it has been in 
other sectors, while a country with vast amounts of natural resources will also be more likely 
to be resource dependent even if it has experienced success in other sectors. What is more, a 
portion of the resource curse literature provides theoretical arguments that natural resources 
tend bring about the economic pressures and poor policy-making that lead to a vicious cycle 
of greater and greater resource dependence (Auty, 2001c, p. 844). Secondly, most of the 
resource curse literature discusses the impact of natural resources once they have been 
extracted from the ground, either through the economic destabilisation of Dutch disease, or 
through the infectious impact of rents. Few would argue that resources have much of an 
impact while lying beneath the ground. So by measuring what is estimated to be under the 
ground we gain little insight regarding the economic, political and social impact these 
resources may have when (if ever) they are extracted.  
Some countries will also tend to extract more of these resources than others. In fact, more 
developed countries with developed manufacturing and service sectors may be less inclined 
to exploit all their reserves of natural resources. This may be for a number of reasons: (1) 
Environmental regulations in more developed countries will likely be more stringent than in 
developing countries. This will make extraction relatively more expensive and in some cases 
will prevent projects from ever commencing. (2) Some countries will prevent natural 
resource exploitation because of negative externalities on other sectors. The government of 
Costa Rica, for example, has discouraged mining investment and banned open cast mining 
with cyanide in order to protect its biodiversity – the basis for its successful tourist industry; 
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(3) in countries where manufacturing exports are important, government policymakers – 
aware of some of the pitfalls associated with resource booms – will be wary of allowing 
increased natural resource exports to drive up the real exchange rate reducing 
competitiveness in manufacturing exports. (4) Knowledge regarding the quantity of reserves 
found within a country will depend largely on the quality of scientific and commercial 
research that has gone into geological mapping. It is possible that more developed countries 
will appear to be more resource abundant due to greater expertise from investment in 
specialist education at an earlier period resulting in the carrying out of more geological 
studies over a longer period of time (Stijns, 2006, p. 1065). This could have relevance for 
present study as countries with better education could also be better at finding their resources. 
While one can argue that foreign mining and oil companies also conduct exploration in the 
developing world, such activities are usually supported by government and smaller domestic 
firms that sell on concessions after finding exploitable deposits. Such measures then may not 
themselves be such useful indicators of natural resource abundance. 
Another measure of natural resources used that is considered to avoid many of the problems 
associated with both of the approaches mentioned above is natural capital‘s share of a 
country‘s total capital stocks taken from World Bank estimations. This measure is considered 
to be adequate for growth studies, as is it exogenous from GDP (Gylfason & Zoega, 2003). 
However, natural capital as a share of total capital would be inappropriate for the present 
study given its obvious interdependence with human capital – and therefore education – as a 
share of total capital. Any increase in education would cause a seesaw effect thereby 
decreasing natural capital‘s overall share and vice versa. 
In deciding on an appropriate natural resources variable for the present investigation, this 
study applies a measure of natural resource dependence, rather than trying to approximate 
pure abundance. It is argued here that there is, in fact, good reason to focus on natural 
resource dependence rather than pure abundance. The basis for this is that most of the 
theoretical reasoning presented in the previous section requires a degree of dependence to be 
applicable. After all, it would be absurd to expect natural resources to somehow disrupt a 
country‘s long-term growth and development without, to some degree, impacting on 
economic and political life. A measure of resources in gross terms – be it a total or per capita 
value – is of little use since it is its relative importance that will surely decide its impact on 
the behaviour of governments and other actors in a society.   
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Furthermore, while the arguments against using a measure of natural resource dependence as 
an indicator of abundance are valid, it is rather simplistic to argue that resource dependent 
countries are dependent simply because of development failure, while non-resource 
dependent countries are such because of development success. After all, natural resource 
dependence cannot come about in the absence of natural resources, and neither can countries 
with no natural resources become natural resource dependent simply by failing in other 
sectors. Common sense tells us that the real basis for a country‘s level of dependence on 
natural resources will most likely result from first, pure natural resource abundance, 
combined with second, how successful it has been in its historical economic development in 
expanding into others sectors. This leads us to a concept of dependence that specifies both 
abundance and lack of alternatives and as dimensions of varying importance.  
Pure abundance, on the other hand, refers to the existence of natural resources and a measure 
of their quantity (for simplicity, we will ignore the accessibility of the resources). It is 
difficult to argue in favour of a causal relationship, since there is no real theoretical 
explanation for why abundance in itself should have any impact at all on a country‘s 
economy. Dependence, on the other hand, refers to the relative role natural resources play. It 
implies that a), the resource has in fact been extracted and is not lying in the ground, and b) it 
provides an indicator of how important this activity is for the national economy in 
comparison to other activities. Unlike abundance then, natural resource dependence provides 
us with a conceptual rational to study it.  
The criticism of dependence, that it also reflects failure in other sectors, is still valid one, 
however. It is proposed here then that the best manner to represent natural resources in 
regression models is to use a measure of natural resource dependence, while attempting to 
control for the possibility that dependence came about completely or partially through 
development failure. The most commonly used standard measure we have available for 
assessing success in economic development is GDP per capita.  
In view of the above then, the present study will utilise oil rents as a percentage of GDP and 
non-fuel mineral rents as a percentage of GDP as measures of natural resource dependence, 
while including GDPpc as a catch-all control variable. While still imperfect, it is the author‘s 
opinion that such an approach is superior to simply looking at dependence or abundance and 
comes closer to isolating the ―natural resources‖ variable in an explanatory form, where an 
impact on economic and political life can be better understood.  
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4.3.2 The Dependent Variable  
It is difficult to measure education in a manner where cross country comparisons are possible, 
not least because most available measures show quantity of inputs rather than capturing 
quality of output. Different studies have chosen a variety of measures including average total 
years of education, primary and secondary enrolment rates, dropout rates, educational 
attainment, and variations on education spending. Studies that use enrolment rates or total 
years of education, while having the advantage of measuring how many people are involved 
in education, still suffer from the problem of measuring inputs rather than outputs. Knowing 
how long people spend in education tells us little about how educated they are upon 
completion. This is particularly prevalent given the disparity in educational quality across the 
world. Enrolment rates, on the other hand, tell us little if people do not stay in school (a 
common problem across the developing world). Some developing countries may have 
compulsory secondary enrolment, while also experiencing high rates of non-attendance. 
Additionally, much less data is available for these measures, thus reducing the sample size of 
any cross-country statistical study. Educational attainment represents another possible 
measure of education. However, this also suffers from the problem of lack of reliable data. It 
is also probable to suffer a sampling effect because those countries with the poorest education 
records are likely those where data is less available. These points are additional to the major 
problem of comparing grades across countries (see Barro & Lee, 2001).  
The present study employs education spending data from the World Bank‘s (2008) National 
Accounts data on Adjusted Net Savings, and refers to education spending as a percentage of 
gross national income (GNI). This measure of education expenditure is comprised of all 
operating expenditures, including wages and salaries, but excluding capital investments in 
buildings and equipment. The data compiled by World Bank staff using estimates based on 
data held by the United Nations Statistics Division's Statistical Yearbook, and the UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics database. The variable is logged to draw in outliers and is represented 
by the EDUCATION%gni in the tables. While this manner of measuring education has a 
number of important limitations – principally that it fails to capture how education 
expenditure is distributed between sectors, the quality of the expenditure, and the outcomes 
of such expenditure – it does provide a proxy for government intent. Given that many of the 
different theoretical mechanisms for why natural resources could prejudice education occur 
through a reduced incentive for governments to invest in education, education to GNI as a 
measure will be adequate to capture this.  
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While increased public spending has been linked to government corruption, as a means of 
facilitating rent-seeking (Keefer & Knack, 2007), this problem is less likely with education 
spending than in other sectors. In fact, some studies have provided empirical evidence that 
more corrupt governments tend to spend less on education, because it gives less opportunity 
for rent seeking than large-scale capital intensive projects in infrastructure and the military 
(Mauro, 1998; Delavallade, 2006). By excluding investments in buildings, using education to 
GNI further guards against the possibility that spending is undertaken in order to indulge in 
rent extraction, since government capital investment in construction would be the area of 
educational expenditure most vulnerable to corruption. It is for this reason that education to 
GNI rather than Public education expenditure as a percentage of GDP – another commonly 
used measure of education expenditure available from the World Bank – is being used. 
Another important reason is availability of data given that education spending to GNI has 
three times as many data points as public spending on education to GDP. The two are also 
highly correlated with a coefficient of 0.89. 
The objective is not simply to measure education, which will be subject to a wide variety of 
variables particular to each country, but rather to gauge government intent and commitment 
to education. While it may not be ideal to reduce such a concept down to pure monetary 
expenditure in terms of national wealth, it does represent a viable indicator enabling 
comparison of policy across countries. For this reason as well as those argued above, it is the 
view here that education to GNI is a useful measure of education expenditure for such 
purposes. 
4.3.3 Explanatory Variables  
As discussed above, oil and mineral rents as a percentage of GDP are used as the preferred 
measure of natural resources. The data source is the World Bank Environmental Indicators 
and is calculated annually as the difference between the value of production at world prices 
and the costs involved in production. Oil and gas are separated from non-fuel minerals and 
are represented as LnOILRENT%gdp and LnMINERALRENT%gdp in the tables. Both 
variables are logged to pull in outliers. The reason for separating oil from non-fuel minerals is 
that several studies have suggested different types of resources may exhibit distinct patterns 
in their impact (Boshchini et al., 2007). Table 1 lists the countries most dependent on oil and 
minerals in 2006, the final year of the time-series used in this study. One can see immediately 
a difference in the relative role of oil compared to minerals both in the number of dependent 
countries and the extent of their dependence.  
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Table 1. Countries ranked by contribution of oil and minerals to GDP for the year 2006 
Oil share of GDP, 2006 % Mineral share of GDP, 2006 % 
1. Iraq 92.61 1. Papua New Guinea 35.45 
2. Equatorial Guinea 79.14 2. Mauritania 23.17 
3. Congo, Rep. 75.79 3. Chile 22.15 
4. Libya 62.35 4. Mongolia 21.79 
5. Azerbaijan 61.89 5. Zambia 21.58 
6. Angola 60.82 6. Peru 10.51 
7. Kuwait 57.39 7. Congo, Dem. Rep. 10.38 
8. Saudi Arabia 56.71 8. Guinea 9.22 
9. Chad 55.60 9. Botswana 6.83 
10. Gabon 53.35 10. Suriname 5.90 
11. Oman 42.74 11. Zimbabwe 5.41 
12. Yemen, Rep. 38.57 12. Guyana 4.97 
13. Brunei Darussalam 38.01 13. Australia 4.46 
14. Iran, Islamic Rep. 37.97 14. Bolivia 3.84 
15. Turkmenistan 32.98 15. Kazakhstan 3.29 
16. Nigeria 32.96 16. Ghana 3.03 
17. Venezuela 32.69 17. Tanzania 2.86 
18. United Arab Emirates 31.91 18. Dominican Republic 2.61 
19. Kazakhstan 28.33 19. Indonesia 2.60 
20. Qatar 27.59 20. Cuba 2.51 
21. Ecuador 27.44 21. South Africa 2.36 
22. Syrian Arab Republic 26.42 22. Brazil 2.33 
23. Bahrain 24.25 23. Jamaica 2.09 
24. Algeria 23.10 24. Bulgaria 2.05 
25. Sudan 19.17 25. Namibia 2.00 
26. Russian Federation 18.77 26. Philippines 1.64 
27. Papua New Guinea 18.15 27. Russian Federation 1.49 
28. Trinidad and Tobago 16.42 28. Armenia 1.48 
29. Norway 13.83 29. India 1.36 
30. Vietnam 12.20 30. Honduras 1.26 
Source: World Bank Environment Indicators (2011). www.worldbank.org 
 
Other studies have suggested that the resource curse may operate through a threshold effect 
(Mehrara, 2009).  While Mehrara discussed principally a threshold in the growth of the sector 
(i.e. the size of a boom), there is also reason to believe that the relative size of the sector may 
also have an impact that operates at a threshold. To allow for this possibility, two dummy 
variables are created (OIL.DUMMY and MINERAL.DUMMY) that set a threshold of 10%, 
where countries whose oil or metal rents are less than 10% of GDP are assigned the value of 
0 with those exceeding 10% being assigned 1. The value of 10% is very close to the mean 
plus two standard deviations of the initial rents data. 
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4.3.4 Control Variables 
Per capita GDP is highly correlated with how much a country spends on its education (in 
percentage terms as well as total expenditure). It also captures a wide variety of other factors 
that have influenced a country‘s historical development and may have an impact of education 
policy. This variable is logged to pull in outliers and is represented as LnGDPpc in the tables. 
Many critics of the curse hypothesis point out that resource dependence is likely the result of 
a country‘s failed historical development. As discussed above, GDP per capita is perhaps the 
single best measure available of a county‘s economic development and represents a catch all 
control that goes a long way to isolating the variables of interest.     
Per capita GDP growth (GDPpcGRW) is also included, as it tends to be negatively correlated 
with education spending. While this may sound counterintuitive, it is simply because 
education spending tends to be ―stickier‖ than growth rates, resulting in countries with fast 
growth rates appearing like poor performers on education even if education spending is 
increasing. So while the government of a growing economy would be expected to increase 
public spending as its revenues increase, these budget decisions would generally lag behind 
the publication of growth statistics. Additionally, this controls for any natural convergence 
between poorer countries, which are expected to grow at faster rates, and richer countries that 
tend to grow more steadily.  
Population density and Population 
Two variables are used to control for demographic differences between countries. A logged 
population density variable (LnPOPDEN), because densely populated countries tend to spend 
less on education in per capita terms, as a given level of spending tends to be more effective 
when people are concentrated in a smaller geographical area. Countries with a large 
population have also been found to spend less on education. So a logged population variable 
(LnPOP) is also included. 
Democracy and Autocracy 
The democracy dummy is constructed from the Polity IV data series, which is a standard 
measure of institutional democracy (Gurr & Jaggers, 1995). Democracy takes on the value 
―1‖ if a country‘s democracy rating equals +6 or above on the polity scale and ―0‖ if it falls 
below. This sets a high threshold for democracy since the Polity scale ranges from -10 to 
+10. This variable is included since democracy is considered to enable a society to demand 
better education from its government. Therefore, policy options that promote democracy 
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could have the potential for improving education spending. The autocracy dummy is created 
in the same way. Autocracy takes on the value of ―1‖ if a country‘s democracy rating equals  
-6 or lower and ―0‖ if it falls above. Aside from the discussions mentioned above related to 
the role of democracy, there is also reason to believe that autocracies in particular may 
exhibit distinct characteristics from other regime types along the polity scale  (Ansell, 2008). 
Civil War 
The civil war dummy is made using the backdated Uppsala dataset on armed conflict. An on-
going civil war is coded 1 if a country is experience political conflict where at least 25 deaths 
have occurred in a single year and 0 if not (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & 
Strand, 2002). Because of the high costs and inefficiencies associated with civil war, it could 
be expected to suck investment away from welfare spending. 
4.3.5 Other Explanatory Variables 
Other explanatory variables employed represent economic freedom (EC.FREEDOM), as a 
measure of economic openness; a measure of institutional quality and legal security 
(INSTITUTIONS); and a measure of governance (GOODGOV.).  
Good Governance  
The good governance variable comes from the Control of Corruption Index from the 
International Country Risk Guide and represents the ability of a government and its 
institutions to combat corruption. Since predatory governments and high degrees of rent 
seeking have been associated with natural resource based economies, this variable may be 
illustrative.  
Economic Freedom and Instituions 
Data on economic freedom comes from the Economic Freedom Index produced by the 
Canadian Fraser Institute. The index is produced using data collected for forty-two variables 
within the five broader categories of: size of government; legal structure and security of 
property rights; access to sound money; freedom to trade internationally; and the regulation 
of credit, labour and business (Gwartney & Lawson, 2008). By including economic freedom, 
it is possible to gauge its impact on education, thus representing another area where policy 
changes could make improvements. The measure of institutional quality also comes from the 
Economic Freedom index and represents the Legal Security and Property Rights subcategory. By 
controlling for this category against the main Economic Freedom Index, we can better ascertain the 
impact of openness through policy rather than legal and institutional factors that may make a country 
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more or less attractive to trade and investment, but are likely attributed to its historical development. 
Without controlling for these institutional factors, there would be a high risk of endogeneity since the 
Economic Freedom Index assigns a higher score for countries with good institutional and legal 
systems not just trade policies that may be more, or less open. The influence of the institutions 
variable also provides a manner with which to assess the impact of variation in institutional quality as 
a potential factor mediating any effect of natural resources, as has been argued by a number of studies 
mentioned in section three.  
Interaction Terms: Oil x Good Governance and Oil x Economic Freedom 
Aside from using the variables mentioned above, interaction terms of oil and economic 
freedom (EC.FREEXOIL) and oil and good governance (GOODGOVxOIL) are used. The 
rationale for using the variables in this way is that, while two variables may generally tend 
towards a particular effect, they may combine to produce a wholly different impact. Using the 
interaction variables may be of particular value given that much of the literature on education 
indicates different effects depending on regime type and trade policy (see section 3). Table 1 
provides descriptive variable information.  
Table 2. Descriptive variable information 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
LnEDUCATION%gni 5099 1.28 0.49 -1.14 2.56 
LnOILRENT%gdp 4316 -6.07 5.70 -11.51 4.66 
LnMINERALRENT%gdp 4299 -7.21 4.72 -11.51 3.20 
INSTITUTIONS 2655 5.09 2.06 1.02 9.62 
EC.FREEDOM 3525 5.88 1.22 2.1 8.79 
GOODGOV. 3052 3.08 1.38 0 6.17 
LnGDPpc 4316 8.41 1.26 4.92 11.20 
GDPGROWTHpc 6308 1.94 6.19 -50.49 90.07 
LnPOPULATION 7404 15.53 1.85 9.89 20.99 
LnPOP.DENSITY 7288 3.76 1.49 -0.46 9.72 
DEMOCRACY 7962 0.33 0.47 0 1 
AUTOCRACY 7962 0.36 0.48 0 1 
CIVILWAR 8109 0.15 0.35 0 1 
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5. RESULTS 
In view of the on-going debate regarding the resource curse hypothesis, the model presented 
in this study was intentionally conservative. For instance, variables representing civil war and 
regime type – thought to be indirect mechanisms through which the resource curse is 
transmitted – are used as control variables, since their omission or inclusion as explanatory 
variables may have be contentious for some. Secondly, the variable used for resource 
intensity was logged even though the precise focus of the study is resource dependent 
countries, which are naturally outliers from the mean. One could argue that using the logged 
values may underestimate the effect of natural resources. Another point worth mentioning is 
that all regressions bar one were run first using a sample of all countries and then a second 
time using a sample of only developing countries. None of the models run displayed 
differences in results of any note. In fact, the findings were remarkably similar.   
5.1 Results for Resource Curse Effect 
Column 1 of Table 3 presents the basic regression model for the effect of natural resources on 
education spending. The sample includes results for 125 countries with 3285 observations 
over the period 1980 to 2006. Year dummies are included, but not shown in the table. The 
control variables for per capita GDP (LnGDPpc) and per capita growth (GDPGROWTHpc ) 
behave as expected and are both highly significant at the 1% level with GDP having a 
positive and growth a negative effect on education spending. The demographic variables 
(LnPOPULATION and LnPOP.DENSITY) are also significant at the 1% level and, as 
predicted, are both negatively associated with education spending. Democracy 
(DEMOCRACY) is positive, but not significant, as is autocracy (AUTOCRACY). Civil war‘s 
(CIVILWAR) effect on education spending is intuitively negative and is significant at the 1% 
level. Oil (LnOILRENT/gdp) is negatively correlated with education spending and is 
significant at the 1% level. Minerals (LnMINERALRENT/gdp), on the other hand are positive, 
but not significant.  
Column 2 shows the same model applied to a sample reduced to non-OECD countries. The 
sample size drops to 2788 observations. Changes in the coefficients and significance of 
LnGDPpc, GdpGROWTHpc, LnPOPULATION, LnPOP.DENSITY, and CIVILWAR are all 
negligible, while DEMOCRACY and AUTOCRACY remain insignificant. Oil‘s effect remains 
negative and significant at the 1% level with a slight increase in the negative value of the 
coefficient from -0.0533 to -0.0636. Minerals (LnMINERALRENT/gdp) remain positive and 
not significant.  
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Columns 3 and 4 show the same model for all countries and non-OECD countries 
respectively, while two dummy variables (OIL.DUMMY and MINERAL.DUMMY) substitute 
for the logged values used in the first two columns. The dummy variables give the value of 1 
to those observations where the value of oil or mineral rents were above 10% of total GDP 
and 0 to those under 10%. This is aimed at capturing any possible threshold effect that has 
been discussed in some of the resource curse literature. In both columns, the effect of the 
demographic and economic control variables is substantively unchanged, as is the impact of 
CIVILWAR. DEMOCRACY and AUTOCRACY remain insignificant. The effect of oil remains 
negative and highly significant at the 1% level. Minerals become negative and just miss 
significance at the 10% level (13%). There is almost no difference between the results for the 
regression run for all countries and the one for non-OECD countries.  
The basic regression model shown in Table 3 shows a strong negative correlation between oil 
dependence and education spending for both the logged continuous variable and a dummy 
variable of oil rents. In contrast to oil, the logged minerals variable was positive for education 
spending, while failing to achieve significance. The minerals dummy, however, was negative 
just failing to achieve significance. The idea of a threshold effect then is only weakly 
supported. Interestingly, regime type appears to have little impact with both democracy and 
autocracy dummies remaining insignificant throughout.  
Column 5 includes a lagged version of the independent variable (L.EDUCATION%gni), 
which is the education spending in the year previous to the observation in question. The 
inclusion of this variable is designed to counter autocorrelation resulting from unknown 
explanatory variables causing a bias in the Newey West estimations. The Newey West 
standard errors are therefore dropped from this regression. Including this variable is a rather 
severe test of the model, since the lagged variable will almost certainly dominate in its 
predictive power. The number of observations falls slightly from the 3285 in the basic model 
to 3249. This is most likely due to gaps in data where a previous year‘s education spending 
was not available. This will have resulted in some observations being dropped because of a 
need to have consecutive years of education spending data.   
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Table 3 Regressions of natural resources on education spending globally and among non-
OECD countries, 1980-2006 
                                               LnEDUCATION%gni 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
LnOILRENT%gdp -0.0533*** -0.0636***   -0.00755*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0172)   (0.00287) 
LnMINERALRENT%gdp 0.0191 0.0248   -0.00570 
 (0.0310) (0.0323)   (0.00702) 
LnGDPpc  0.186***  0.186*** 0.182*** 0.178*** 0.0103*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0133) (0.0103) (0.0121) (0.00253) 
GdpGROWTHpc -0.00892*** -0.00935*** -0.00879*** -0.00909*** -0.000959* 
 (0.00203) (0.00208) (0.00201) (0.00207) (0.000552) 
LnPOPULATION -0.0592*** -0.0592*** -0.0652*** -0.0675*** -0.00189 
 (0.00669) (0.00777) (0.00689) (0.00793) (0.00128) 
LnPOP.DENSITY -0.0507*** -0.0511*** -0.0506*** -0.0517*** -0.00107 
 (0.00815) (0.00947) (0.00716) (0.00857) (0.00158) 
DEMOCRACY 0.0392 0.0312 0.0446 0.0407 0.00376 
 (0.0279) (0.0280) (0.0273) (0.0275) (0.00582) 
AUTOCRACY 0.00917 0.0154 0.00656 0.00986 0.00924 
 (0.0358) (0.0368) (0.0355) (0.0364) (0.00703) 
CIVILWAR -0.0827*** -0.0863*** -0.0858*** -0.0886*** -0.00357 
 (0.0318) (0.0334) (0.0317) (0.0334) (0.00698) 
OIL.DUMMY   -0.191*** -0.200***  
   (0.0481) (0.0514)  
MINERAL.DUMMY   -0.204 -0.213  
 
  (0.136) (0.140)  
LagEDUCATION%gni     0.957*** 
Constant 
    (0.00683) 
 0.942*** 0.959*** 1.070*** 1.157*** 0.0141 
 (0.133) (0.171) (0.130) (0.164) (0.0279) 
Observations      
 3,285 2,788 3,285 2,788 3,249 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Ln = natural log 
Year dummy included in all models 
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Lagged education spending dominates the model as expected predicting almost 96% of 
education spending. As one would expect, the introduction of lagged education has a 
dramatic effect on all of the other variables. Civil war, population, and population density all 
undergo a drop in their coefficients of at least 1 decimal place and all of them become 
insignificant. Autocracy and democracy stay insignificant, while minerals become negative 
but not significant. The only variables to remain significant after the introduction of lagged 
education spending are per capita growth, GDP per capita and oil rents. Growth undergoes a 
reduction in its significance and falls to the 10% level, and drops in its coefficient by a 
decimal place. GDP per capita remains significant at the 1% level, while experiencing a drop 
in the coefficient by a decimal place. Oil rents also maintains significance at the 1% level, 
while the coefficient falls from – 0.0533 to – 0.00755. The robustness of oil to the 
introduction of the lagged dependent variable further supports the hypothesis of a negative 
effect of oil dependence. It also suggests that oil dependence is not only correlated with lower 
education spending in each year, it is also negatively correlated with year on year increases in 
education spending.   
5.2 Results for Effects of Governance on Education Spending 
Table 3 demonstrated a strong negative correlation between oil and education expenditure. In 
Table 4, a measure of good governance (GOODGOV.) is added, as well as an interaction term 
of good governance and oil (OILxGOODGOV.) intended to capture interactive effects. 
Columns 1 and 3 again represent the regression models including all countries, while 2 and 4 
present results for non-OECD countries only.   
Column 1 sees the number of observations drop to 2376 from the 3385 in Table 3. This is due 
to the more limited data availability for the good governance variable. As expected, we see a 
strong positive correlation between good governance and education spending. GOODGOV. is 
positive and significant at the 1% level. Oil maintains its negative effect at the 1% level, 
while changes in the coefficient are negligible. Mineral rents become negative and significant 
at the 10% level with a coefficient similar to that of oil. GdpGROWTHpc remains negative, 
but loses significance, while CIVILWAR remains negative, but loses significance. This is 
likely due to a strong negative correlation of good governance with civil war. DEMOCRACY 
and AUTOCRACY remain insignificant. Column 2 sees a drop in the number of observations 
to 1962 and paints an identical correlatory picture, with only slight changes in the value of 
coefficients as a distinguishing feature from Column 1.    
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Table 4 Regressions of natural resources and governance on education spending globally 
and among LDCs only, 1980-2006 
 LnEDUCATION%gni 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
LnOILRENT%gdp -0.0557*** -0.0751*** -0.0567 -0.0578 
 (0.0183) (0.0204) (0.0409) (0.0507) 
GOODGOV. 0.0758*** 0.0824*** 0.0756*** 0.0854*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0156) (0.0130) (0.0154) 
OILxGOODGOV.   0.000358 -0.00733 
   (0.0113) (0.0172) 
LnMINERALRENT%gdp -0.0618* -0.0683* -0.0619* -0.0679* 
 (0.0353) (0.0367) (0.0354) (0.0368) 
LnGDPpc 0.176*** 0.197*** 0.176*** 0.196*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0172) (0.0156) (0.0173) 
GdpGROWTHpc -0.00337 -0.00390 -0.00337 -0.00391 
 (0.00240) (0.00253) (0.00241) (0.00253) 
LnPOPULATION -0.0599*** -0.0536*** -0.0599*** -0.0534*** 
 (0.00770) (0.00929) (0.00770) (0.00927) 
LnPOP.DENSITY -0.0893*** -0.105*** -0.0893*** -0.104*** 
 (0.00904) (0.0105) (0.00904) (0.0107) 
DEMOCRACY -0.0455 -0.0487 -0.0455 -0.0484 
 (0.0314) (0.0318) (0.0316) (0.0319) 
AUTOCRACY 8.67e-05 0.00340 2.26e-05 0.00520 
 (0.0437) (0.0443) (0.0435) (0.0442) 
CIVILWAR -0.0308 -0.0336 -0.0308 -0.0337 
 (0.0347) (0.0364) (0.0348) (0.0364) 
Constant 1.058*** 0.867*** 1.059*** 0.853*** 
 (0.156) (0.203) (0.156) (0.203) 
     
Observations 2,376 1,962 2,376 1,962 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Ln = natural log 
Year dummy included in all models 
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Column 3 introduces the interaction term OILxGOODGOV. to the model shown in column 1. 
The interactive effect of oil and good governance is positive, but does not reach significance. 
Oil rents‘ also becomes insignificant at, while good governance remains positive at 1%, while 
mineral rents stay negative and significant at 10%. Democracy, autocracy and civil war 
undergo little change and remain insignificant. Again, column 4 displays little variation when 
limiting the sample the non-OECD countries showing negligible variation in the value of 
coefficients and significance of each variable. 
The failure of both oil, and the interaction term of oil and good governance, to achieve 
significance is likely due to a problem of high intercorrelation between the three variables 
producing inflated standard errors. The three variables were tested for joint significance (not 
shown), by testing the significance only of the three terms. This showed them to be jointly 
highly significant meaning the result for the interaction term can be accepted.  
Table 4 shows, as one would intuitively expect, that good governance is positive and strongly 
correlated with higher education spending. However, even when holding good governance 
constant, oil rents maintained an independent and significant negative effect. The further 
introduction of an interaction term of oil and good governance showed as positive effect, 
while good governance remained positive and oil remained negative. This interesting result 
clearly requires further probing.  
Figure 2. Conditional effects plot of oil rents and good governance on education spending 
 
Figure 1 represents the conditional effects plot of oil rents and good governance. The graph 
divides countries into those whose good governance is low, those with a level of governance 
around the mean and those with high levels of governance. One can see that the negative 
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effect of oil is greatest in countries with low levels of governance. In countries with 
governance levels around the mean, oil has a reduced, but still negative effect. However, in 
countries with higher levels of governance, oil‘s effect is reversed and becomes positive 
compared to countries with low or no oil. This finding tentatively suggests that well governed 
countries make use of oil rents to increase the educational budget, while less well governed 
countries may be more likely to suffer the negative externalities associated with dependence 
on high oil rents. 
5.3 Results for Interaction of Economic Freedom and Oil  
Table 5 introduces the variables EC.FREEDOM, and INSTITUTIONS to the basic model, as 
well an interaction term of oil and economic freedom (OILxEC.FREEDOM). Column 1 
shows a drop to 2285 observations from the 3285 in the original model in Table 3. This is due 
to the data availability in the Economic Freedom Index from the Fraser Institute. The 
INSTITUTIONS variable is the ILSPR subdivision of the overall index and represents the 
legal and institutional components. Including the institutions variable is designed to control 
for the positive effect that good institutions have on the overall economic freedom score in 
the index, thereby isolating the more policy related components. Both EC.FREEDOM and 
INSTITUTIONS show a highly significant effect on education spending at the 1% level. 
Institutions are positive, as one would expect, while Economic freedom‘s effect is negative 
for spending on education. Oil becomes positive, but loses significance, as does minerals. 
Democracy is positive and civil war negative, but both fail to reach significance, due 
probably to a strong correlation to the institutional variable. Interestingly, AUTOCRACY 
becomes negative and, for the first time, highly significant at the 1% level. Column 2 shows 
1855 observations for same model limiting the sample to non-OECD countries. The only 
differences of interest are that oil becomes negative, but not significant, while economic 
freedom‘s coefficient undergoes a slight increase in its negative effect level. Additionally, 
autocracy drops in significance from the 1% to the 5% level. 
Column 3 introduces an interaction term of oil with economic freedom 
(OILxEC.FREEDOM.), which is negative and significant at the 10% level and has a 
coefficient of -0.0218. Oil becomes positive and significant at 10% with a coefficient of -
0.126, while economic freedom on its own remains negative at 1% level significance with a 
coefficient of -0.0479, a slight drop from Column 1. Institutions remain positive at the 1% 
level with a negligible change in its coefficient. Minerals remain positive, but not significant. 
Democracy and civil war are not significant, while autocracy remains negative and 
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significant at 5%. Column 4 paints a very similar picture with the only observation of interest 
being a slight increase in the significance of the interaction term to the 5% level.  
Table 5 Regressions of natural resources and economic freedom on education spending 
globally and among non-OECD, 1980-2006 
 LnEDUCATION%gni 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
LnOILRENT/gdp 0.00162 -0.0188 0.126* 0.132* 
 (0.0186) (0.0205) (0.0736) (0.0800) 
INSTITUTIONS 0.0952*** 0.0928*** 0.0975*** 0.0953*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0126) (0.0115) (0.0127) 
EC.FREEDOM -0.0614*** -0.0849*** -0.0479*** -0.0677*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0193) (0.0184) (0.0210) 
OILxEC.FREEDOM   -0.0218* -0.0274** 
   (0.0114) (0.0132) 
LnMINERALRENT/gdp 0.0531 0.0501 0.0567 0.0522 
 (0.0439) (0.0451) (0.0441) (0.0453) 
LnGDPpc 0.134*** 0.157*** 0.129*** 0.153*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0189) (0.0180) (0.0190) 
GdpGROWTHpc -0.00395 -0.00380 -0.00402 -0.00403 
 (0.00254) (0.00266) (0.00253) (0.00266) 
LnPOPULATION -0.0694*** -0.0714*** -0.0711*** -0.0733*** 
 (0.00794) (0.00970) (0.00806) (0.00981) 
LnPOP.DENSITY -0.0386*** -0.0380*** -0.0382*** -0.0363*** 
 (0.00966) (0.0118) (0.00976) (0.0121) 
DEMOCRACY 0.0149 0.0177 0.0131 0.0142 
 (0.0317) (0.0322) (0.0320) (0.0326) 
AUTOCRACY -0.119*** -0.112** -0.114** -0.104** 
 (0.0453) (0.0464) (0.0453) (0.0467) 
CIVILWAR -0.00537 -0.0204 6.47e-05 -0.0151 
 (0.0366) (0.0388) (0.0364) (0.0385) 
Constant 1.672*** 1.664*** 1.644*** 1.612*** 
 (0.250) (0.288) (0.252) (0.291) 
     
Observations 2,285 1,855 2,285 1,855 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Ln = natural log 
Year Dummy included in all models 
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In view of the dramatic change in the sign of oil‘s coefficient and significance after the 
introduction of the institutions and economic freedom variables, the model was tested (not 
shown) to reveal if the change in the effect of oil was due to the introduction of  
INSTITUTIONS  or EC.FREEDOM. This demonstrated that the change in oil‘s coefficient 
and significance was due to the introduction of the institutional variable and not due to 
economic freedom. This strengthens the argument that the quality of institutions and 
governance has a major bearing on any curse effect. 
Table 5 also demonstrates a negative correlation between economic freedom and education 
spending – once institutional quality is controlled for. Columns 3 and 4 also demonstrate a 
negative and significant interactive effect of oil and economic freedom suggesting and 
exacerbation of the negative effect in oil dependent countries. Of further interest in Table 4 is 
the consistent negative and significant effect of autocracy on education spending. This may 
indicate some kind of relationship between autocracy variable and economic freedom. 
However, without further probing, this remains speculatory.   
5.4 Summary of findings 
The results presented above can be summarised into three main findings. Firstly, oil showed a 
consistent negative correlation with education spending, while maintaining significance at the 
1% level in all of the standard multivariate regressions. This finding was net of the inclusion 
of a variety of control variables, including the introduction of the lagged dependent variable 
into the model – a severe test of oil‘s predictive power. Oil only lost significance when 
measures of institutional quality and economic freedom were introduced in the final table. 
The results for minerals showed less evidence of any curse effect. In fact, the standard logged 
minerals variable was often positive – although not significant – for education spending. The 
oil dummy was also strongly correlated with reduced education spending and was significant 
at the 1% level, while the use of the mineral rents dummy showed minerals – at over 10% of 
GDP – to be negative for education spending coming close to significance at 13%. While the 
change in sign of minerals should be interpreted with some caution, it is important to note 
that the effect of minerals turned negative after substituting the dummy variable for the 
natural log of the continuous variable. The first hypothesis then, that natural resources are 
negatively correlated with education spending, is supported for oil. Minerals, on the other 
hand, did not exhibit a consistently negative effect on education.   
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The second finding of note is that good governance was intuitively positive for education 
spending. Its introduction failed to alter oil‘s negative coefficient, however, indicating an 
independent negative effect of oil. However, further probing of the conditional effects of the 
interaction term of oil and good governance revealed that oil has a positive impact on 
education spending in well-governed countries. Further regressions that introduced a measure 
of institutional quality showed a very strong impact of institutions. Not only were institutions 
positive for education spending, the introduction of the variable knocked out the negative 
effect of oil altogether. The second hypothesis then, that good governance and institutional 
quality are mitigating factors with the potential to prevent the resource curse is supported. 
The final set regressions are designed to capture the effect of economic policy openness on 
education spending. The results show economic freedom to be negatively associated with 
education spending – once institutional and legal quality is controlled for – and to be 
significant at the 1% level. Further results showing the interaction effect of economic 
freedom and oil show that the interaction of the two has an added negative effect on 
education. These results do not support the hypothesis that greater policy openness will 
reduce the negative effect of oil. They provide support, however, for the contrary hypothesis 
that a more open economic policy may compound the problem of low education spending in 
oil dependent states.  
5.5 Discussion and Interpretation of Results  
Based in the theoretical reasoning behind the resource curse hypothesis, this study set out to 
test whether natural resources are negatively correlated with government education 
expenditure. More specifically, this involved investigating the relationship between the 
intensity of natural resource rents (a measure of natural resource dependence) and the share 
of national income spent on education (a measure of government priority towards education).  
The results for oil demonstrate evidence supporting a hypothesis for a resource curse effect 
on education spending. These findings support the argument, forwarded by Gylfason (2001a) 
and Birdsall et al. (2001), that dependence on natural resources reduces the incentive for 
governments to invest in education and contradicts a view that governments will spend a 
higher proportion on education where state budgets are bolstered by resource rents.  
However, the hypothesis does not hold for all natural resource sectors. While oil is 
consistently associated with reduced education spending, there is less evidence of a negative 
correlation with non-fuel minerals. This finding is arguably as important as the findings for 
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oil, in that it may demonstrate a need to distinguish between categories within the natural 
resource sector. Numerous influential studies of the resource curse have used a variety of 
measures of resource abundance/dependence as a whole, with some studies even including 
agriculture (Sachs & Warner, 1995, 2001; Gylfason, 2001b). While it is not the task of this 
paper to question the findings of such studies, these results cast doubt on the wisdom of 
treating natural resources as a uniform group.  
This disparity in findings between oil and non-fuel minerals, rather than muddying the 
theoretical waters surrounding the curse hypothesis, may in fact clarify some of its finer 
points. Gylfason‘s (2001a) argument that human capital investment is crowded out as an 
effect of Dutch Disease provides one potential explanation. This process requires a degree of 
sloth and lack of forward thinking on the part of policy makers. Therefore, it should follow 
that for sloth to have an impact on policy, government captured resource rents – as well as the 
prospect of future rents – must be sufficiently high to lure governments into thinking they 
have found the answer to all their woes. The rents that governments are generally able to 
capture from oil production are markedly higher than those that are produced from non-fuel 
mining. There are various technical as well as economic reasons for this: one is that oil 
producers have been able to counteract the terms of trade problem by maintaining high oil 
prices through OPEC. As a result, profit margins are likely to be higher with oil production 
than with metal mining where market forces require production to be more or less as efficient 
as other mines throughout the world just to stay viable. Lower profit margins for companies 
also mean governments have less bargaining power and scope for maximising rent capture 
through taxation. In order for mining investment to be economically viable under these 
circumstances, governments may find they need to provide tax incentives to encourage FDI 
or domestic investment. A number of developing world governments have even given mining 
companies varying degrees of tax exemption in a similar vein to manufacturing export 
zones
4
. This in turn, means that the governments capture less of the rents, thus reducing the 
likelihood of sloth inhibiting policy. From a behaviourist standpoint then, it is less likely that 
a new discovery of vast tin or nickel reserves would cause governments to forget about the 
benefits of education. On the other hand, the considerable rents captured from a new 
discovery of oil during sustained periods of high oil prices is more likely to blind 
governments into discounting the future. 
                                                     
4
 A good example of this was the Honduran mining law passed in 1997. 
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The idea that there exists a disparity between oil and minerals in the rents available to be 
captured by the state, also suggests that rent seeking and rentier state arguments may be more 
applicable to oil abundant states than those rich in metals and other non-fuel minerals. On the 
other hand the disparity in the findings may simply reflect the relative dependence on non-
fuel minerals, given that they usually represent a much smaller share of GDP. Table 1 
demonstrates that only 7 countries in 2006 were dependent on minerals for more than 10% of 
GDP, compared to oil where 10 countries depended on the resource for over 50% of GDP. 
The simple answer then could be that the comparatively high value of oil means that more 
countries depend on the commodity compared to very few countries that depend on minerals.  
It has been argued in the previous theoretical sections of this study that a degree of 
dependence is required for a resource curse to take hold. The results here support such a 
proposition. The results from regressions using dummy variables for natural resources point 
tentatively towards a threshold effect for the curse, whereby even minerals were negative in 
the few countries where dependence was highest. This is intuitively correct in that it is 
unlikely that, for every barrel of oil produced, a country would see a corresponding drop in 
education spending. Far more likely is that a threshold exists whereby oil – or possibly other 
natural resources – begins to shape an economy and condition political and institutional life. 
Dependence by its very nature then must operate at a threshold.  
It has been argued above that there exists a wide array of channels by which natural resource 
dependence could potentially impact on government attitudes towards education spending. 
The behaviourist perspective above offers one explanation. However, a major weakness of 
this explanation is that it requires governments to fall into the trap of deprioritising education, 
because of an irrational belief that education is less important where resource rents are 
plentiful. Furthermore, for such a pattern to show up as a trend in cross-country empirical 
comparisons, it would not be enough for some governments to exhibit such behaviour. It 
would have to emerge as a trend among the governments of resource dependent countries 
generally. Given all we know regarding the problematic nature of natural resource led 
development, it is unlikely that so many governments would enact bad policy due to an 
irrational over optimism.  
It is more likely then, that incentives, and not foolishness, will shape how the powerful act. 
More rational actions based in the incentives for both public and private elite to engage in 
deleterious activities as a means of capturing rents seems a much more plausible explanation. 
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High rent oil dependent countries appear to create a unique environment whereby elites can 
maximise profits without a degree of co-operation from the majority of citizens, as would be 
the case in a resource poor country where labour intensive production would be more 
important. It would appear that elites in resource dependent countries do not require this co-
operation. Instead they achieve acquiescence with a mixture of repression, low taxes and 
boondoggle spending. Such states have been referred to as rentier or petro-states (Karl, 2004). 
Importantly though, education is less likely to form part of this spending due to its tendency 
to empower people and embolden calls for democracy and a fairer allocation of wealth.  
Such explanations, however, remain hypothetical since it has been beyond the scope of this 
study to test specific causal avenues, not least due to inadequacy in the availability of data. 
However, given that almost all of these mechanisms are ultimately mediated by a policy 
decision – whether or not to prioritise education in the state budget – the quality of 
governance and institutions clearly has the potential to counteract these tendencies. The 
findings here provide strong evidence supporting the idea that good governments can, not 
only avoid the curse; but also utilise the extra revenue to reinvest in the country‘s human 
capital. Mehlum et al. (2006), Boschini et al. (2007), Collier & Goeris (2007) and Butkiewicz 
& Yanikkaya (2010) have, amongst others, found quality of institutions and government to be 
key explaining the poor economic performance of resource dependent countries. The present 
findings support such a hypothesis as being also applicable to education. Such a proposition 
is also supported by the successful experiences of Norway and Botswana where institutions 
and legal instruments – and not the day to day actions of politicians – are primarily 
responsible for the hitherto successful allocation and investment of natural resource rents.  
Whether institutions then can be considered a mechanism of the resource curse, or simply the 
regulating factor for other transmission channels, is open to debate. However, striving to 
improve institutional quality and governance appears to offer the most effective – it not 
necessarily realistic – manner of combatting the negative externalities on education 
associated with oil led development.  
While improving the quality of institutions and governance will clearly not be easy to 
implement, changes than can be made through policy are perhaps a more achievable goal in 
the short term. In this regard, the final set of results tested the potential for greater integration 
with the global economy to mitigate the negative effect of oil on education expenditure. 
Sachs & Warner (1995), Arezki & van der Ploeg (2007), and Papryrakis & Gerlagh (2004) all 
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argue that a lack of openness is one of the principal reasons for poor growth rates among 
resource dependent countries. Butkiewicz & Yanikkaya (2010), on the other hand, find the 
opposite, with openness being a negative factor within the curse thesis. What is more, the 
theoretical arguments for why openness might have a positive or negative impact on 
education spending are distinct to those applicable to economic growth. For this reason the 
present study turned to some theories from the public spending and globalisation literature for 
possible explanations regarding the effect of greater economic liberalisation on education. 
The subsequent findings suggest a negative effect of policy openness on education 
expenditure. Further results point to the possibility that the interaction of greater policy 
openness with oil may even exacerbate oil‘s negative effect. While it would be difficult to 
argue that openness accounts for some of the negative impact from oil on education spending, 
the results certainly do not indicate economic liberalisation to be a viable policy option to 
poor levels of education spending in oil rich states.  
Proponents of the efficiency hypothesis (discussed in section 3) would argue that the negative 
affect of openness is simply the result of increased exposure to global market forces that 
make constraints on welfare spending by the need to be competitive. The problem with this 
argument is that one would expect that countries with high oil rents would be better placed 
than most countries to compensate citizens for such events by spending on desirable public 
goods like education. On the other hand, it is also possible that this alternative compensation 
hypothesis is less likely, since oil rich countries tend to be more authoritarian and more 
immune to internal demands to be compensated for the negative aspects of greater economic 
integration.  
This idea is in tune with Rudra & Haggard (2005) who found reduced education spending in 
authoritarian countries with open economies. However, the results could be interpreted along 
the lines of the models proposed by Bourguignon & Verdier (2000) and Falkinger & 
Grossman (2005), who seem to agree that elites in oligopolistic systems have an interest in 
investing in education within a closed economy, because the need to produce manufactured 
goods domestically provides opportunity to profit from the investment in education. In an 
open system trade would replace domestic production and take away the incentive to invest in 
education. Both of the explanations given above require the assumption of some degree of 
autarchy and/or undemocratic system. Since we know that oil rich states tend to be more 
authoritarian (Ross, 2001; Karl, 2004), these ideas may explain the ambiguous results for 
democracy and autocracy, given that authoritarian governments may make diametrically 
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opposite decisions regarding education spending depending on the trade regime. Furthermore, 
the autocracy dummy became negative and significant when openness was introduced into 
the model. However, these ideas remain speculative and it is beyond the scope of the present 
study to do more than hypothesise regarding their explanatory potential. Furthermore, the 
variables for democracy and autocracy were mostly consistent in their lack of predictive 
power. This may, however, have been due to the coding of the variables that set a high 
standard for democracy in classifying countries. It may also be a reflection that changes in the 
level of formal democracy may do little to change established social and economic structures 
as proposed by Acemoglu & Robinson (2008). 
The present findings indicate the existence of a negative impact from natural resources on 
education through the path of a reduced government prioritisation of education due to 
resource dependence. However, it would be wrong to assert that these results contradict the 
findings of a number of scholars who find against the resource curse hypothesis. The reason 
for this is that this study has focussed on resource dependence rather than abundance as its 
primary explanatory variable. The disagreement then is more conceptual than empirical. 
Although alternative abundance measures are being favoured because they are exogenous to 
the dependent variables in question, it is likely that this exogeneity, rather than making such 
measure more appropriate, in fact stems from the lack of any logical causal mechanism. 
6. CONCLUSION  
The analysis presented above demonstrates a consistently strong and statistically significant 
resource curse effect of oil on education spending. Further empirical analysis shows no 
evidence that a more open economic policy mitigates this effect. In fact, increased openness 
appears to exacerbate the negative impact of oil on education spending, with potential knock-
on effects for human capital stocks. Those prescribing blanket economic liberalisation for 
closed oil dependent economies should take heed. However, further results indicate that good 
governance and better institutions may be a way around the resource curse. Efforts to assist in 
the improvement of these factors should therefore be prioritised. 
The results showing a negative effect of oil cannot be explained by a simple crowding out 
hypothesis thought to occur as a result of Dutch Disease. It is argued here that the negative 
effect of oil will more likely be capturing the elite bias over budgeting decisions towards their 
interests over those of the majority of citizens in oil dependent countries. The public spending 
literature indicates that education spending policy is far more nuanced and subject to political 
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and economic interests that are, in turn, conditioned by a variety of incentives and 
disincentives among those with power and influence. Further research may wish to examine 
these issues in the context of natural resource dependent economies, where rent-seeking 
along with more authoritarian governments is commonplace. Such research should also 
recognise the disparity between the curse effects of different subdivisions of the natural 
resource sector. The same tests carried out for oil revealed little evidence of a negative 
association between minerals and education spending indicating the need for specificity.  
In regard to the on-going debate surrounding the resource curse hypothesis, it is argued that 
focussing on resource abundance is of limited value to understanding the potential 
consequences of following a natural resource led development strategy. Measures of 
abundance give little indication of the relative importance of natural resources to other 
sectors. Abundance, therefore, is isolated from the relative role of rents and therefore from 
the incentives for elites within and without government to engage in rent-seeking. While the 
prevalence of rent-seeking will partially depend on the gross quantity of rents available to be 
captured, the relative benefit of engaging in such activity will be more likely to decide the 
extent to which individuals have an incentive to do so. Moreover, the relative influence on 
policy of those elites who benefit from such activities will be reduced as dependence is 
reduced. According to this logic education spending should be higher where a higher 
proportion of the rich and influential have invested in labour intensive production. In oil 
dependent countries, elites are more likely to specialise in rent capture to the detriment of 
education. 
Many of the issues raised above clearly require further probing. Future studies for instance, 
may do well to investigate the composition of education expenditure in oil dependent 
countries, focussing of the distribution of funding between primary, secondary and tertiary 
sectors. Evidence from the public spending literature suggests that spending is often targeted 
at the tertiary sector, subsidising the education of elites, rather than investing in primary and 
secondary education (Ansell, 2008). Future studies may also benefit by focusing on the direct 
impact of natural resources on other development outcomes, rather than continuing the 
somewhat finicky debate on growth. Indeed, it is suggested here that arguments over 
measurements of abundance are of little value for our understanding of the particular 
economic and political dynamics that seem to exist in resource dependent countries.  
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The fundamental problems associated with natural resources and development may not be 
ones of natural resources in themselves. They may, in fact, be the same problems for 
development that all countries have had throughout history. The difference made by natural 
resources may be to permit bad policy to persist. The findings with regard to education 
support such a hypothesis. In short, the key to the resource curse may not be that natural 
resources cause countries to fail. It may be that natural resources allow incompetent and 
corrupt governments to survive by staving off the most extreme forms of failure. The case of 
education is perhaps the best to capture this in that there is no worthy reason for good 
governments not to invest in education. This will be especially so given that investment in 
education will decide how likely a country is to escape resource dependence and succeed in 
today‘s global economy. 
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